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INTRODUCTION
THERE is a notion, common throughout law enforcement cir-
cles, that a criminal's repeated conduct increases the chances
over time that he will one day be caught. Each time a drug dealer
completes another sale, a rapist brutalizes another victim, or a bur-
glar enters another home, the new offense offers the government a
new opportunity to catch the offender. With the advent of new
technology, the recidivist criminal also provides the government
the opportunity to solve previous cases by examining his likeness,
DNA, fingerprints, and any other evidence he leaves behind. Ac-
cordingly, for many criminals, the expression, "quit while you're
ahead," is very good advice.
For some crimes, however, cessation of conduct does not benefit
the criminal. To the contrary, the termination of the conduct in
question accelerates the government's identification of the perpe-
trator and almost assures that he will be punished. This Article fo-
cuses on a particular type of this conduct: corporate fraud. The re-
lationship between the corporate fraudster's cessation of conduct,
and the resulting increase in his probability of detection and pun-
ishment, is what I refer to as the "linkage" problem.
Commentators agree that corporate fraud is socially undesirable
and should be deterred.' Where they differ is how the law should
accomplish that goal. The debate has traditionally focused on the
" Fraud is bad. Pretty much everyone, communitarians and contractarians, liberals
and conservatives, can agree with this broad conclusion (though perhaps not its policy
implications)." Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 Cornell L.
Rev. 775, 824 (2006).
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identity of the enforcers (public or private),2 the type of adjudica-
tion (criminal or civil)3 and, more recently, the type and degree of
sanctions.4 Scholars have largely ignored, however, the temporal
problems that inhere with deterring corporate fraud.' Commenta-
tors rarely distinguish between potential and "current" perpetra-
tors of fraud (for the purposes of this Article, "mid-fraud perpetra-
tors" or "MFPs"). Nor do they consider how the issue of timing
undermines traditional enforcement strategies designed to deter
and incapacitate perpetrators.
This Article fills an important gap by exploring how timing af-
fects the enforcement of criminal anti-fraud laws.6 In particular, it
examines the effects of timing on both traditional enforcement
techniques (increasing sanctions and hiring more law enforcement
agents), and alternative and often more controversial methods
(undercover operations and amnesty programs).
The traditional law enforcement response to corporate fraud is
straightforward and predictable. Following widely-reported scan-
dals, politicians increase penalties for a given group of offenses,
and promise an increased devotion to detecting and prosecuting
2 Compare Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 3 (2002)
("[W]ith all their imperfections, contract and market-based approaches are more
likely than regulation to reach efficient results"), with Prentice, supra note 1, at 828-
30 (arguing that a strong SEC presence is necessary to combat corporate fraud).
3See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971 (2006)
(suggesting a framework for explaining why certain frauds are treated criminally or
civilly).
'Compare Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 279
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org2007/02/21/podgor.html (arguing that many federal white
collar prison sentences are unnecessary and inordinately severe), with Andrew Weissmann
& Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes, 116 Yale L.J.
Pocket Part 286 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org2007/02/21/weissmannblock.html (con-
tending that, with the exception of certain severe sentences, most white collar sentences
are appropriate).
' I use the term "corporate fraud" to refer to those fraud-based crimes (mail, wire,
and securities fraud and various other financial crimes based on deceit) that occur in
corporate or business settings.
6 This Article focuses exclusively on attempts to curb fraud through the criminal
law. The analysis below, however, should also apply in various civil and regulatory
settings.
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those offenses.7 Prosecutors then implement the traditional ap-
proach by publicly arresting wrongdoers (and alerting the media in
advance of their arraignments) and, after prevailing at widely-
reported trials, pressing for long prison sentences and other nota-
ble penalties.8
The federal government's most recent response to corporate
fraud, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbox"),9 aptly demon-
strates the traditional law enforcement approach. Among other
changes, Sarbox increased statutory maximum penalties for mail
and wire fraud, created new criminal statutes for securities-related
frauds and for obstruction of federal investigations, and required
public companies to adopt a number of structural changes that os-
tensibly increased the likelihood that corporate criminals would be
caught.'" During the same year, the Bush Administration an-
nounced the creation of a Corporate Fraud Task Force and in-
creased the SEC's budget.11
7E.g., President George W. Bush, President Announces Tough New Enforcement
Initiatives for Reform (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/07/20020709-4.html ("When abuses ... begin to surface in the corporate
world, it is time to reaffirm the basic principles and rules that make capitalism work:
truthful books and honest people, and well-enforced laws against fraud and corrup-
tion."). See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and American Corporate Regula-
tion, 61 Bus. Law. 155 (2005).
'See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller & Alexei Barrionuevo, U.S. Prosecutors File Indict-
ment Against Skilling, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 2004, at Al; Martin Zimmerman & Lianne
Hart, Former Enron CEO Gets 24-Year Sentence, L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 2006, at Al,
A15 ("The government said Monday that it was filing a court action to seize Lay's
condominium in Houston, property associated with a Lay family investment partner-
ship and a bank account with more than $22,000... ."); Carrie Johnson, Prosecutors
Oppose Delay of Ebbers's Term, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 2005, at D3; Erin McClam, Mar-
tha Stewart Loses Bid to End House Arrest Early, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 12,
2005, at C3 ("In court papers that mocked the request for a shorter sentence, prosecu-
tors had urged the judge to uphold the original sentence."); Rorie Sherman, It's Scan-
dal Time, Tr. & Est., July 2002, at 55 ("[L. Dennis Kozlowski's] accuser, Manhattan
District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, held a press conference almost gleefully
announcing the 'first step in a long investigation' into the world of wealthy art collec-
tors and unscrupulous dealers who may be evading millions in sales taxes.").
9 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of, for example, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
'0 See Robert C. Brighton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Primer for Public Companies, and
Their Officers and Directors, and Audit Firms, 28 Nova L. Rev. 605, 606 (2004).
" See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Les-
sons from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 Buff. Crim. L.
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The government's reliance on significant criminal sanctions and
announcements of enhanced enforcement resources is hardly new.12
During the last three decades, the federal government has steadily
increased penalties for white collar crimes such as mail and wire
fraud. Whereas the typical white collar criminal in 1970 might have
received a sentence of probation and a fine, current white collar
criminals who enter the federal system can expect to spend at least
one year in prison.3
Policymakers laud traditional law enforcement techniques for
their ability to deter future executives from fraudulent practices. 4
In doing so, they all but ignore their policies' affects on MIFPs-the
people who are in the midst of committing frauds when laws or en-
forcement intensity suddenly change.
The premise of this Article is that increases in sanctions and like-
lihood of punishment do not, and indeed cannot, persuade MFPs to
abandon their course of conduct. Although observers often blame
less-than-expected deterrence on behavioral factors such as loss
Rev. 165, 166-67 (2004); Michael Schroeder, SEC Gets a Raise, but Will It Be
Enough?, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at C1.
12 For an argument that much of the criminal sanction aspects of Sarbox were un-
necessary, see Frank 0. Bowman lI, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious His-
tory and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim.
L. 373 (2004).13 Podgor, supra note 4, at 279.
14 In its sentencing memorandum supporting a substantial prison sentence for for-
mer Worldcom CEO Bernard Ebbers, prosecutors for the United States Attorneys
Office for the Southern District of New York reasoned:
Corporate executives across the country, and the American public as a whole,
will be measuring the seriousness of Ebbers' conduct in part by the seriousness
of his sentence. More importantly, corporate executives will, in the future, con-
sider the sentence imposed on Ebbers whenever those executives are tempted
to mislead shareholders or manipulate the financial statements of their compa-
nies. General deterrence serves an important function and works, perhaps even
more effectively than in the context of other types of criminal conduct, to pre-
vent financial crimes of the sort committed by Ebbers.
Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Sentencing Motions at
66-67, United States v. Ebbers, S4 02 Cr. 1144 (BSJ) (S.D.N.Y. June 24,2005), available at
http://awprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/fdes/ebbers -sentencing-usao.pdf.
Whether such penalties actually deter criminals is difficult to determine. See Christine
Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. Corp. L. 361, 366 (2008) ("[W]hether
criminal penalties or civil penalties provide greater deterrence is empirically unknown and
perhaps undeterminable .... ").
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aversion,"5 this Article argues that a key, unexplored reason for the
failure of deterrence in the corporate fraud arena is that MFPs ra-
tionally perceive a link between the cessation of their future crimi-
nal activity and the detection of their prior criminal conduct. I refer
to this phenomenon as "linkage," which is the probability that ces-
sation of future criminal conduct will increase the likelihood of de-
tection of similar, prior conduct.
Corporate accounting fraud aptly demonstrates the linkage
problem. When a manager or executive has already lied to share-
holders about a public company's first quarter profits, she cannot
refrain from lying about second quarter profits without causing
shareholders to doubt the veracity of her prior statements. As a re-
sult, neither increases in sanctions nor visible increases in the prob-
ability of detection will fully deter her from further crime. In fact,
traditional "noisy" law enforcement approaches may cause the
MFP either to increase the magnitude of her crime (to pay for her
additional risk exposure) or to invest resources for avoiding detec-
tion. 6 In those instances, society becomes worse off.
Prudent lawmakers who wish to incapacitate and deter MFPs
from generating further harm therefore must consider alternative
enforcement strategies. One possible strategy, which is used quite
often in prosecuting street crime and corruption cases, is the use of
undercover surveillance and stings.17 The benefit of a sting is that
" For discussions of bounded rationality and its interference with attempts to deter
corporate crime, see James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corpo-
rate Misconduct, Law and Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1997, at 1, 5-8 (prospect the-
ory); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design
of Internal Controls, 93 Geo. L.J. 285, 308 (2004) (loss aversion); Geraldine Szott
Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corpo-
rate Crime, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 937,958-59 (2003) (optimism bias).
1" See generally Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1331 (2006).
17 For a description of how undercover operations such as wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance were used (legally) to combat organized crime, see James B. Ja-
cobs, Coleen Friel & Robert Radick, Gotham Unbound: How New York City Was
Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime 131, 133 (1999) (describing the use of
electronic surveillance as the "chief investigative tool"). Jacobs et al. also discuss in
detail how the government used stings to detect and punish organized crime. See id.
at 175 (discussing an FBI sting operation resulting in arrests of eighty-three people
accused of stealing and fencing goods at JFK airport), 196 (examining how the Man-
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the government increases the likelihood of detection and punish-
ment without tipping off its target. MFPs who are unaware that the
government has increased its likelihood of detection have no rea-
son to invest resources in detection avoidance. Stings, however,
have their own drawbacks. They may be more susceptible to gov-
ernment abuse and they may produce more false positives (identi-
fying as "criminals" people who otherwise are no threat to society).
As such, they may undermine law enforcement's legitimacy. Re-
duced legitimacy, in turn, may lead potential offenders to feel less
bound by normative restraints.
In lieu of relying solely on undercover investigations, the gov-
ernment might instead offer amnesty to corporate criminals (either
by itself or in combination with other law enforcement ap-
proaches). This strategy has been employed in both the tax and an-
titrust contexts, and generally involves the government forgiving all
or most of the offender's prior criminal conduct in exchange for his
cessation of that conduct. 8 However, this strategy too has obvious
drawbacks: while it encourages MFPs to cease criminal conduct, it
simultaneously generates moral hazards for potential offenders.
No enforcement strategy is perfect. The literature of corporate
fraud enforcement is deficient because it fails to consider an impor-
tant reason why some of these strategies fail. This Article fills that
gap by introducing a new concept to the literature of law enforce-
ment, which I call "linkage." Linkage is the perpetrator's estima-
tion of the probability that cessation of future criminal conduct will
result in his apprehension for prior related conduct. Using the
criminal cost/benefit analysis developed by Gary Becker, I demon-
strate that when linkage is high, traditional law enforcement meas-
ures fall short of their deterrence goals and encourage detection
avoidance and further criminal conduct. I then argue that linkage
hattan District Attorney's use of undercover police officers allowed the government
to collect evidence of organized crime's control of the waste-hauling industry on
Manhattan). Gotham Unbound discusses these stings and surveillance operations in a
positive light. For a less positive discussion of undercover operations in narcotics and
street crime cases, see Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Commu-
nal Consequences, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 645 (2004).
"S ee discussion infra Section III.E.
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may be helpful to lawmakers, as they decide between traditional
and alternative law enforcement approaches.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly describes neo-
classical deterrence theory and its application to corporate fraud.
Part II discusses two characteristics of crime, duration and connec-
tivity, that sentencing regimes often ignore. This Part also explains
how these characteristics are present in corporate fraud and how
they combine to create the linkage problem.
Using linkage as a premise, Part III then conducts a theoretical
inquiry of how current and potential fraud perpetrators might fare
under traditional and alternative law enforcement strategies. Fi-
nally, Part IV discusses some of the broader implications for law-
makers and suggests policy approaches designed to address linkage
concerns.
I. THE THEORY OF DETERRING FRAUD
This Part lays out the theory of deterrence in criminal law and
the modern refinements to that theory that have evolved over
time. 9 Because lawmakers often invoke deterrence as the primary
basis for enforcing corporate fraud sanctions, it is useful to con-
sider the neoclassical economic theory of deterrence.
A. Neoclassical Deterrence Theory and Its Refinements
As first explained in modern discourse by Gary Becker, the eco-
nomic theory of criminal law posits that criminals will cease com-
mitting crimes when the net expected benefits from the crime are
outweighed by their expected costs." For the potential criminal,
9 See John T. Scholz, Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Chang-
ing Perspective of Deterrence Theory, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1997, at 253
(describing the evolution of deterrence theory to "incorporat[e] broader institutional
and motivational analyses in order to understand the increasingly complex institu-
tional structures and policy objectives involved in mitigating a growing range of social
harms").
' See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968). Becker, in turn, drew on Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. See
Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in On Crimes and Punishments and
Other Writings 1 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies et al. trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1995) (1764); Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (Etienne Dumont
ed., Richard Hildreth trans., Tripathi Private Ltd. 1975) (1802).
[Vol. 94:12951302
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costs are measured by the prescribed sanction, multiplied by the
probability that the criminal will be caught and prosecuted. In
other words, when B (the criminal's expected benefit) is less than
the product of p (probability of punishment, the shorthand term
for being caught and prosecuted) and the proscribed sanction s, the
perpetrator will abandon the crime.
Becker's work is often taken as the starting point for economic
analyses of law enforcement, although others have added to it.
Whereas Becker theorizes that high monetary sanctions are pref-
erable to longer prison sentences (since prisons cost money),21 oth-
ers have since pointed out that imprisonment is necessary to deter
both irrational criminals and offenders who are judgment-proof.2
This pragmatic recognition of the need for incarceration overlaps
with the expressive theory of criminal law, which posits imprison-
21ment as a method of expressing society's moral norms.
Apart from his preference for monetary over non-monetary
sanctions, Becker's model treats probability of detection and sanc-
tions as fungible substitutes; lawmakers might reasonably choose
high sanctions for most crimes in order to reduce policing costs. 24
Steven Shavell and others have explained, however, that this model
fails to consider notions of "marginal deterrence. 2 1 If all sanctions
21 Becker, supra note 20, at 207-08 ("Fines have several advantages over other pun-
ishments ....").See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1208 (1985) (explaining that solvency limitations for many
criminals necessitate non-pecuniary sanetions such as imprisonment).23 For a discussion of the expressive theory of criminal law, see Johannes Andenaes,
Punishment and Deterrence 110-12 (1974) (observing that "punishment is not only
the artificial creation of a risk of unpleasant consequences but also a means of ex-
pressing societal disapproval"). For more modern discussions, see Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy,
1990 Duke L.J. 1; Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 413 (1999); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emo-
tion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 356 (1996).
24 Becker, supra note 20, at 207 ("The public's decision variables are its expenditures
on police, courts, etc., which help determine the probability ... that an offense is dis-
covered.., the size of the punishment for those convicted... , and the form of the
punishment ...").
25 Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deter-
rent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232, 1245 (1985) ("[R]aising the sanction with the expected
harmfulness of acts gives parties who are not [initially] deterred incentives to do less
harm.").
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are equally high, criminals have no reason to refrain from the worst
crimes. 26 Therefore, some sanctions must be more severe than oth-
ers.27
Deterrence also depends on the perpetrator's evaluation of
risk.' Some criminals may ignore risks because they are overly op-
timistic about their ability to evade detection. Others may be thrill
seekers who enjoy committing crimes in the face of a high prob-
ability of detection.29 Over-optimism and thrill-seeking behavior
ironically may be the characteristics that corporate organizations
are most likely to value and promote."
Apart from subjective valuations of risk, the discounted and de-
clining disutility of imprisonment further reduces the impact of
6 See Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Pun-
ishment, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1171, 1173-74 (2004) ("The marginal deterrence argument,
therefore, is one about creating incentives for individuals to refrain from committing
the same crime on a greater scale.").
27 By contrast, those who adhere to a retributivist or "just deserts" theory of crimi-
nal law argue that commonly held notions of justice demand a connection between
the severity of the crime and the corresponding sanction. See Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453 (1997); Paul H. Robin-
son & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 Minn. L.
Rev. 1829, 1893 (2007) ("[A] criminal justice system that regularly fails to do justice
or that regularly does injustice, as judged by the community's shared intuitions of jus-
tice, will inevitably be widely seen as failing in a mission that the community thinks
important .... ").
For an economic analysis of how one's aversion or preference for risk affects the
disutility of criminal punishment, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the
Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Le-
gal Stud. 1, 4-7 (1999). For a discussion of how law can shape our "tastes" or prefer-
ences for crime, see Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23.
29 See Mark A. Cohen, The Economics of Crime and Punishment: Implications for
Sentencing of Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, 9 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 503, 508 (2000) ("How else do you explain most computer viruses and hackers?
Although some of this activity is motivated by money, such as extortion, it seems that
some computer crime may be perpetrated for the psychic rewards that the offender
receives from crashing other computers.").
30 Donald C. Langevoort has hypothesized that the manner by which corporations
choose and promote managers favors risk-preferring executives over their risk-averse
counterparts. Langevoort, supra note 15, at 299-300. See also Skeel, supra note 7, at
157 (noting that executives who "rise to the top" of corporate hierarchies "tend to be
self confident and willing to take risks") (citing Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The
World of Corporate Managers (1988)).
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criminal sanctions.31 First, for most criminals, the marginal disutility
of each additional year in prison decreases. A six-year jail sentence
does not carry twice the disutility as a three-year sentence. The
stigma of conviction, the pain of separation from one's loved ones,
and the opportunity cost of not being able to work all decrease
over time. This decline in disutility may be expressed as a "dis-
count." A CFO favors receiving a thousand dollars today over a
thousand dollars tomorrow. Similarly, she also fears the disutility
of going to jail tomorrow far more than being in jail five years from
now.32 Discounts affect criminal sentences in two ways. First, they
erode the disutility of additional penalties.3 3 Second, they reduce
the overall disutility of sentences meted out after a long delay.
Delays occur when the government is unable to identify and prose-
cute violators quickly.
Corporate fraud is precisely the type of crime where we would
expect to see delays in identification and prosecution of perpetra-
tors. The crimes are complex and take a long time to unfold and
then investigate. White collar criminals, meanwhile, often have
plausible defenses and sufficient resources to challenge the gov-
ernment at trial. For example, Enron imploded and filed for bank-
ruptcy in December 2001. 3" The trial of Jeffrey Skilling and Ken
Lay, Enron's former CEO and Chairman, did not conclude until
31 For a discussion of discounting and its impact on deterrence, see Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 28, at 2.
32 Two different biases cause the discounts. Risk aversion causes the CFO to prefer
the definite dollar today (and similar benefits) to the uncertain dollar tomorrow. Loss
aversion, on the other hand, causes the CFO to prefer the future prison sentence (and
similar losses) to the more certain one imposed today. "[R]esearch participants in a
wide variety of settings tend to be risk averse with respect to gains and risk seeking
with respect to losses." Tom Baker, Alon Harel and Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of
Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 443,453 (2004).
" Arguably, the declining disutility of prison already reflects the perpetrator's "dis-
count." Professors Polinsky and Shavell, however, treat the discount as distinct from
the decline in disutility. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 28, at 4 (positing that
"[d]iscounting can occur regardless of whether the immediate disutility experienced
each period rises, falls, or remains constant").
3 See Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of Dis-
counting for Equitable Sentencing, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 115, 115-16 (2007).
35Enron Declares Bankruptcy, Houston Chron., Dec. 6, 2001, at Yo! 2.
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May 2006.36 Skilling's 24-year prison sentence was not imposed un-
til October 2006 and did not commence until December 2006,
when the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of his re-
quest for bail pending appeal.37 However miserable Skilling might
be in prison, the disutility of that sentence (and the perceived dis-
utility to potential criminals) arguably was lessened by the delay
between his offense and his ultimate penalty.
In light of discounts and the declining disutility of sanctions, nu-
merous neoclassical accounts of deterrence support policies that
increase the likelihood rather than the severity of the sanction.38
This emphasis is also necessary to counteract criminals who make
mistakes when they calculate probabilities of punishment from a
limited pool of information.3 9 Although scholars often refer to a
singular likelihood of punishment or detection, the enforcement
probability term is itself a composite of several probabilities, in-
cluding the likelihood of: (i) detection; (ii) subsequent apprehen-
sion; (iii) conviction in a court of law; and (iv) sanctions.4" The po-
tential criminal estimates his chances of "getting caught" by
36 Mary Flood, Ex-Enron Bosses Closer to Prison, Houston Chron., May 26, 2006, at
Al.
17 Kristen Hays, No Fanfare as Skilling Steps into Prison Life, Houston Chron., Dec.
14, 2006, at Al.
31 Cohen, supra note 29, at 514-15 (citing empirical evidence that prisoners respond
more readily to more certain punishments than to more severe ones); Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 28, at 6 ("For risk-preferring individuals, the severity of impris-
onment sanctions has a lesser effect on deterrence than the probability of sanc-
tions .... ") (emphasis omitted); Scholz, supra note 19, at 255 (observing that work-
place safety improved after OSHA imposed penalties for violations, but that the size
of the penalty was irrelevant to the level of deterrence).
31 "While there presumably is a positive relationship between actual and perceived
levels of enforcement, it is implausible that individuals' probability estimates are gen-
erally accurate, particularly when the probability is extremely low." Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly In-
formed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. Leg. Stud. 365, 366-67 (1992).
Bebchuk and Kaplow contend that low probabilities of enforcement paired with
maximum sanctions will produce greater mistakes because the criminal's error in es-
timating enforcement probability will result in larger errors when multiplied against a
hiher sanction. Id.
See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and its
Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2211 (1999); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Alon
Harel, Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited,
30 J. Legal Stud. 485 (2001).
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calculating the perceived probabilities of each of these outcomes
and multiplying them together.4'
Complicating the matter further is the fact that probabilities are
not static, but change over time.42 When a CFO commences a
fraudulent scheme, the probability of detection by others might be
rather low. As the scheme unfolds and proceeds throughout time,
various contingencies (both within and beyond the CFO's control)
may significantly increase the probability of detection. For crimes
that take place over a given period of time, this dynamic is signifi-
cant.
Given the foregoing, it should come as no surprise that criminals,
who are constantly forced to calculate and recalculate costs and
benefits, often make mistakes. 3 Effective law enforcement policies
therefore must contend with not only eliminating and reducing
criminal opportunities, but also correcting criminals' mistaken con-
clusions that such opportunities exist.' Here again, increased en-
forcement may serve as a better correction mechanism than in-
creased sanctions. 5
", "Since all four events must occur before the defendant will be punished, the ex-
pected penalty depends on the combined probability of. . the probability of detec-
tion times the probability of prosecution times the probability of a finding of liability
times the expected fine or damage award." Craswell, supra note 40, at 2211.
42David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 45,
65 n.112 (2007) ("Detection is a staged proposition [that] can happen at different
stages in the scheme-ranging from conception, to completion, to the edge of the le-
gal statute of limitations and beyond."). As I explain infra, because of the manner in
which federal criminal law defines and punishes most fraud, early detection is not
likely to result in a diminished sanction.
41 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 14.
"One might see this as a debiasing problem. See discussion infra Subsection IV.B.2;
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. Legal Stud. 199
(2006); Scholz, supra note 19, at 255 ("[A] modest extension of deterrence theory in-
corporates the assumption that the function of the legal system is to keep the risk of
social harms arising from inevitable corporate mistakes within tolerable limits.").
41 Multiple investigations and prosecutions also permit law enforcement agents to
learn from and correct their mistakes. "The agency accumulates data and information
(on criminals, on opportunities of crime), enhancing the ability of future apprehen-
sion at a lower marginal cost." Nuno Garoupa & Mohamed Jellal, Dynamic Law En-
forcement with Learning, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 192, 192 (2004). Of course, if law en-
forcement agents can learn from increased enforcement, so too can criminals.
However, if the law enforcement agency's enforcement is spread over a broad enough
pool (and if agencies are permitted to keep certain details secret), the agency's collec-
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Even when a criminal properly calculates likelihood of detection
and sanctions, there is no guarantee that he will cease committing
all crimes. Substitution effects46 may cause criminals to direct their
criminal activity to another location, to engage in a different crime,
or to invest in techniques that lower the risk of detection.47
One of the great critiques-or refinements, depending on how
one looks at it-of neoclassical deterrence theory comes from the
field of behavioral economics. Whereas Becker assumes that
criminals are rational, adherents of behavioral economics contend
that criminals (indeed, all individuals) are "boundedly rational. 48
They make rational cost-benefit decisions, but do so against a
backdrop of limited time and information. Accordingly, they rely
on certain shortcuts or heuristics, to calculate probabilities of cer-
tain outcomes, and they fall prey to a number of biases that pre-
dictably skew their decisions.49
As its proponents have recognized, the concept of bounded ra-
tionality has several implications for the study of criminal behavior
and criminal law enforcement policy."0 Criminals may succumb to
the "self-serving" bias by cherry-picking the facts that best support
their conception of the world. Their "optimism bias" may cause
them to overestimate their ability to control future outcomes.51
They may fall prey to "hyperbolic discounting," whereby they ex-
cessively discount the costs of near future sanctions (or excessively
tive rate of learning should exceed the rates of the individual criminals within its pur-
view, particularly where the criminal population is disorganized.
6 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385, 2391-
2402 (1997).
"' See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Con-
trol, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1831, 1839-40 (2005) (discuss-
ing displacement); Katyal, supra note 46, at 2402-08 (suggesting that mandatory
minimum sentences for crack cocaine distribution may have led drug dealers to sub-
stitute heroin for crack). See generally Sanchirico, supra note 16 (explaining detection
avoidance).
48 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, in Behavioral Law and Economics 13, 14-15 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000).4 9 Id.
o Id. at 45-47; see also Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law
and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring
Crime, 1 Am. L. & Econ Rev. 276 (1999).
" Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 48, at 47.
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overvalue near future benefits), but do not employ such steep dis-
counts for time periods farther from the present.52 That is, even
though the difference between receiving a dollar today and tomor-
row should be identical to the difference between receiving the
same dollar a year from today and the day after that, criminals are
likely to apply a much higher discount to the 24-hour difference in
the near future, as opposed to the 24-hour difference one year
from now. 3
Finally, as many have noted, not all crimes (and not all crimi-
nals) are amenable to deterrence theory. Some (perhaps most)
criminals lack information necessary to make anything approach-
ing a cost/benefit analysis. Others commit crimes for impulsive or
irrational reasons, and are not likely to respond to increases in
sanctions or increased probability of detection. 4
Monetary crimes such as fraud, however, very often are dis-
cussed under the deterrence rubric, in part because such activity
requires advance planning and reasoning." The criminal must pick
his target(s), set his price, devise a scheme for achieving his desired
payout, and avoid detection during and after the life of the scheme.
Moreover, the individuals who commit crimes in corporate settings
are often engaged in the very type of cost/benefit accounting with
respect to their legitimate "day job" activities. If deterrence has
any value as a theory of criminal law, it should be in the arena of
corporate fraud. 6 It is not surprising that when lawmakers unveil
52Id. at 46.
5 Whereas "ordinary" people might exponentially discount future benefits or costs
according to a static discount figure, criminals (in the bounded rationality model) hy-
perbolically discount future benefits or costs because they are too "present-oriented."
See Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars: A New Rationale for the Existence of Statutes
of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 99, 103 (2002) (citing James 0. Wil-
son & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay?, 9 Just. Q. 359 (1992)).
' See Samuel Kramer, Comment, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt:
Marginal Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 398, 405 & n.32 (1990) (suggesting that deterrence theory does not apply to
crimes of passion).
51 See Cohen, supra note 29, at 503 ("[T]here should be little controversy" that per-
petrators of economic crimes act "in what they perceive to be their own best inter-
est.").
' The few empirical studies of corporate fraud do suggest that where moral inhibi-
tions are low, the threat of formal and informal sanctions can serve as a deterrent. See
Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality:
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strategies for restraining and even eradicating corporate fraud,
those strategies are almost always accompanied by claims that pre-
sume the defendant's calculation of utility and predict the myriad
ways in which the chosen enforcement strategy will successfully al-
ter that calculus.57
B. Deterrence and Uncertainty
Deterrence theory presumes that criminals know they are violat-
ing the law. 8 One might expect this to hold true with corporate ex-
ecutives because they are well-educated and have ready access to
legal advice. When lawmakers draft statutes that are either overly
broad or complex, executives and their agents may experience dif-
ficulty discerning which conduct is and is not illegal, 9
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 Law & Soc'y Rev. 549
(1996) (demonstrating empirically the deterrent effect of sanctions when moral norms
are lacking); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the
Twenty-First Century, 23 Crime & Just. 1, 20-21 (1998) (discussing the importance of
formal and informal sanctions in tax compliance). Others have questioned, however,
whether corporate fraud is in fact the result of deliberate choice by individuals. See,
e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gate-
keeper, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 983, 997 (2005) (arguing that fraud is the result of situ-
ational factors); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51
St. Louis U. L.J. 941 (2007) (examining the importance of organizational culture). Al-
though organizational factors may affect one's decision to commence criminal con-
duct, for reasons set forth in Part III infra, they may well recede for MFPs who are
deciding whether to end such conduct.
" In a July 2007 speech, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez praised members of
the Corporate Fraud Task Force for obtaining 1200 convictions of corporate wrong-
doing over a five-year period: "[P]erhaps the most important accomplishment [of the
Task Force] is the criminal conduct that never occurred because of the wide-spread
deterrent effect triggered by the tireless and thorough efforts of the Task Force and
everyone in this room." Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzalez
at the Corporate Fraud Task Force 5th Anniversary Event (July 17, 2007), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2007/ag-speech 070717.html.
" This presumption has been attacked in numerous instances. See, e.g., Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science In-
vestigation, 24 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 173, 174 (2004) ("Potential offenders commonly
do not know the legal rules, either directly or indirectly, even those rules that have
been explicitly formulated to produce a behavioural effect.").
" Even as the criminal law expands to cover broader categories of commercially
questionable conduct (thereby allowing a jury to convict virtually anyone who is
charged), criminals still may be uncertain of the outcome of an arrest insofar as prose-
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The issue of uncertainty is a common feature of discussions of
corporate fraud' and regulatory offenses such as environmental
crimes.61 Many have written of the uncertainty that permeates fed-
eral fraud cases, particularly applications of the "honest services"
prong of the mail and wire fraud statutes.62 Apart from the "honest
services" category, the "uncertainty argument" is overemphasized.
Many (if not most) executives know that lying to a company's
shareholders about its finances; or lying to the government about
the costs of certain services rendered; or colluding with other com-
panies to fix prices; or dumping chemicals in a stream and then ly-
ing about it, are illegal and socially undesirable acts. Indeed, execu-
tives often go to great lengths to cover up these crimes, precisely
because they know they are "outside the bounds of market
norms."
63
Thus, at least where most corporate frauds are concerned, this
Article presumes that uncertainty does not increase the number of
frauds through accident. The hypothetical managers referred to in
this Article are presumed to know that they are doing something
that is illegal.
Less frequently discussed is the role that legal uncertainty may
play as a rationalization. Executives who do not wish to think of
themselves as criminals may be able to convince themselves-and
others in the community-that they are doing nothing wrong be-
cause of alleged "uncertainty" in the law.' Uncertainty may not
cutors retain charging discretion. For a discussion of overcriminalization, see Erik
Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703 (2005).6 See, e.g., Buell, supra note 3, at 1972.
6, See Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 Va. L. Rev. 415,
444-45 (2007) (discussing the effect of uncertainty regarding the mens rea required
for conviction for environmental crimes).
62 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). For an argument that the statutes that outlaw corpo-
rate fraud are too broad, see Geraldine Szott Moohr, On the Prospects of Deterring
Corporate Crime, 2 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 25, 28-30 (2007) ("In prohibiting everything,
vague and broad criminal laws prohibit nothing.").
Buell, supra note 3, at 2015. Buell continues: "The presence of consciousness of
wrongdoing, as evidenced by steps taken to disguise the actor's conduct.., estab-
lishes that the actor feared and sought to evade the adverse judgments of her market
peers, including refusal to transact." Id.
Moohr hypothesizes that the firm's institutional setting and the uncertainty inher-
ent in the law permit otherwise law-abiding executives who view themselves as inher-
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explain the existence of the crime, but it may well provide both a
defense that society finds plausible and a means by which other-
wise intelligent people can rationalize their behavior and see them-
selves as a part of the moral community even as they proceed with
their criminal conduct.65 If that is the case, increases in sanctions
may have little effect on potential offenders, since they will always
convince themselves and their social peers that such sanctions ap-
ply to acts committed by others, but not to their own conduct.
C. Formal Sanctions, Moral Norms and Collateral Effects
The sanction that a criminal receives includes not only the for-
mal punishment ordered by a court (such as a fine or term of im-
prisonment), but also those collateral effects that attach to formally
ordered penalties.' For example, as a result of a criminal convic-
tion, an individual may lose his job and future employment oppor-
tunities, his property (beyond the amount required to pay his fine),
his social status, and his connection with his family. The collateral
damages of criminal law have long been discussed in the street
crime context." They also impact white collar offenders. Indeed,
one recent empirical study indicates that, in the realm of corporate
fraud, collateral effects are quite steep, attach very early, and are
often irrevocable.:
To the extent that informal sanctions (such as the disapproval of
one's family or friends) flow from moral norms, it is useful to con-
sider the connection between norms and deterrence. Some scholars
view social norms as divorced from cost/benefit analysis; norms
ently "ethical" to delude themselves into thinking that their conduct is not in fact ille-
gal. Moohr, supra note 62, at 31-32.
65See Regan, supra note 56, at 949-50 (explaining that individuals rely on cognitive
frames to explain behavior "by recourse to what they regard as socially acceptable
reasons").
6 For a discussion of the numerous collateral consequences that attach to investiga-
tions of corporate wrongdoing, see Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S.
Martin, The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. Fin.
Econ. 193 (2008), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304405X
(follow link to PDF).67 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Cal. L. Rev.
323, 345-47 (2004) (discussing collateral consequences of conviction on offenders,
their communities, and their families).
6 Karpoff, Lee & Martin, supra note 66, at 3.
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serve as a stand-alone alternative to deterrence as a guide of public
policy.69 Others argue that norms may be used to achieve society's
ends by forcing wrongdoers to internalize both informal and formal
sanctions." The informal sanctions, however, necessarily flow from
the formal ones. Policymakers therefore may find it difficult to
calibrate formal sanctions optimally because those sanctions trigger
informal and collateral costs that are difficult to measure."
II. FRAUD AND ENFORCEMENT: WHEN TIMING MATTERS
Despite forty years of refinements, the basic model of deterrence
remains intact: when the net benefits of a crime outweigh the net
costs, the perpetrator will proceed with socially undesirable con-
duct. To reduce such conduct, society must focus on increasing the
criminal's expected penalty by enacting harsher sanctions, increas-
ing the probability of punishment, or some combination of both.
In theory, corporate fraud ought to be the type of crime that is
easily deterred. After all, perpetrators of corporate fraud calculate
costs and benefits on a daily basis and have multiple opportunities
to make money through legitimate means. Moreover, their crime,
fraud, is not exactly an "impulse" crime." Many of the most famous
frauds within the last decade (such as Enron's off-balance-sheet
transactions, Worldcom's wrongful accounting treatment of line
expenses, and the more recent examples of options back-dating at
companies such as Brocade) were complex, evolved over a number
of months or years, and required their participants' deliberate and
concerted activity.
Ordinarily, critics of deterrence theory contend that most indi-
viduals are unaware of, or lack the ability to understand, complex
legal rules. 3 By contrast, the corporate executives who commit
frauds are well aware of the legal ramifications of their activity. In
69See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 56, at 554.
7See Dan M. Kahan, Response: Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path
of Deterrence, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2477, 2478-79 (1997).
"' See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 Geo. L.J. 1743,
1750 (2005). See generally Andenaes, supra note 23.72 Concededly, some frauds may arise because of an impulse to lie. Cf. Kim, supra
note 56, at 1026-34.
" See generally Robinson & Darley, supra note 58.
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many instances, a legal expert (the in-house lawyer) occupies the
office down the hall or is only a phone call away. Although uncer-
tainty about legal requirements may cause a few individuals to
provide misinformation, most of the scandals of the last decade
were deliberately hidden from the outside world. This suggests that
their perpetrators knew quite well that they were breaking the
law.74
In sum, if any group is likely to be deterred by increased criminal
sanctions, it is the white collar criminals who perpetrate fraud.
Why then, are they under-deterred? This Part attempts to answer
that question by exploring two characteristics of crime that derail
traditional law enforcement policies: duration and connectivity.
Duration refers to the time it takes to commit a given crime. Con-
nectivity might be described as a kind of "path dependence." To-
gether, these facets contribute to the concept I call "linkage,"
which is the probability that cessation of future illegal conduct will
increase the probability of detection and conviction for previous
instances of similar conduct. I then discuss three common features
of corporate fraud: it is fairly easy to commence, is difficult to ter-
minate, and often requires the perpetrator's ongoing presence. As
a result, corporate fraud often includes the two components of
linkage: it takes place over a prolonged period of time, and it is
highly path dependent.
A. Duration and Connectivity: The Building Blocks of Linkage
Despite the fact that lawmakers often invoke deterrence as a
primary goal of law enforcement policy, they are largely indifferent
to the issues of timing and connectivity, and how these features af-
fect changes in enforcement policy.75 The federal statutes that de-
fine most crimes, as well as the Sentencing Guidelines that sanction
them, almost completely ignore the duration of the crime.76 Instead,
14 See Buell, supra note 3, at 2015.
" For more cynical accounts of lawmakers' use of deterrence as a basis for increased
penalties and the enactment of overlapping and additional crimes, see Luna, supra
note 59, at 719; William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
Mich. L. Rev. 505,506-09 (2001).
76 Neither the major federal statutes that define criminal fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-
1342, 1344 (2000), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West Supp. 2007), nor the Sentencing Guide-
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criminal law is far more interested in the size, rather than the tim-
ing, of the victim's loss (or in the case of narcotics, the weight of
the drug).
The reason that criminal law all but ignores the temporal aspects
of crime is that retributivism has come to captivate both popular
and scholarly discourse.77 A community that seeks "just deserts" for
perpetrators cares far more about the size and scope of the harm
(measured by monetary loss or drug weight) than it does the dura-
tion of the scheme. Timing, in a retributivist world, is relevant only
insofar as it serves as a proxy for: (a) the defendant's state of mind
(with longer frauds suggesting a more "evil" or deliberate intent to
do harm) and/or (b) the scope of the harm when loss is undetect-
able.
Conversely, under a deterrence-based theory of law, timing mat-
ters.8 Perpetrators who have entered the beginning phases of their
criminal activity are likely to respond far differently to certain en-
forcement measures than those who either have completed their
criminal activity or, at the other end of the spectrum, those who are
only considering engaging in such conduct. A society that seeks to
prevent and contain harm will care deeply about the intersection of
lines' fraud provision, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 (2007), take into
account the length of time necessary to complete the fraud, other than the Sentencing
Guidelines' departure for defendants who demonstrate that their crime was an "aber-
rant act." See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.20, which permits a down-
ward departure from the proscribed guidelines sentence when the crime: "(1) was
committed without significant planning; (2) was of limited duration; and (3) repre-
sents a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life." Ex-
cept where other circumstances exist to demonstrate that the fraud was particularly
sophisticated or widespread, courts are not likely to sentence defendants on the basis
of the fraud's duration alone. See, e.g., United States v. Alpert, 28 F.3d 1104, 1108-09
(11th Cir. 1994) (reversing the district court's upward departure on the basis of the
duration of defendant's fraud scheme). Compare Alpert, with United States v. Ben-
skin, 926 F.2d 562, 563, 566-67 (6th Cir. 1991) (permitting upward departure where
defendant defrauded over 600 victims during a five-year period).
77 See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 15, at 939 ("Empathy with employees, investors, and
creditors readily explains the public's demand for punishment."). For a contrary view
that the law governing corporate crime focuses primarily on deterrence, whereas the
law governing street crime addresses retributivist notions, see Darryl K. Brown,
Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1295, 1313-15 (2001).
" See generally Paul R. Hoeber, The Abandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt
and Other Problems of Temporal Individuation, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 377 (1986).
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the government's imposition of sanctions, society's exposure to
harm, and the criminal's attainment of his benefit."
Unfortunately, neither the substantive nor sentencing aspects of
criminal law handle the issue of timing very well. Consider the doc-
trine of completeness. Criminal liability attaches when a statute's
elements are fulfilled and the crime is "complete." The statute of
limitations, the statutory window within which the government
must initiate its prosecution, runs from the moment of "complete-
ness." ' Under the standard iteration of criminal law, many com-
pleted crimes "begin" and "end" in the same moment. Although
this concept may make sense for certain crimes ("murder" begins
and ends when the victim dies), it bears no relation to reality for
crimes characterized by conduct that takes place over a prolonged
period of time.
With the aid of the "continuing offense" doctrine, Congress and
courts have attempted to cure the shortcomings of completeness
doctrine, although they have done so only partially and rather hap-
hazardly. When a crime is deemed a continuing offense, "its com-
mission is not complete until the conduct has run its course."8'
Unlike a discrete crime, a continuing offense is one in which the
defendant's conduct "even before it is concluded, may fit the statu-
tory definition of a crime, thereby permitting institution of a prose-
cution before the offense is complete."82
Conspiracy is a continuing offense; a fraud undertaken by two or
more people in concert begins when the elements of conspiracy are
met and "continues" through the date of the last overt act in fur-
therance of the conspiracy." Single-actor frauds, on the other hand,
create far more confusion. Some frauds are statutorily defined as
continuing offenses, while others are deemed discrete.' Courts
"For simplification, I assume throughout much of this Article that benefits and
harm are equivalent. In reality, for many defendants, the loss amount in a corporate
fraud case will far outstrip the perpetrator's monetary benefit.
See generally Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).
81 United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995).
sId.
s Christian Davis & Eric Waters, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 44 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 523, 536 & n.82 (2007) (citing Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946)).
'4 See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure
§ 18.5(a) (4th ed. 2004).
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have further confused the issue by applying inconsistent means of
measuring the severity of these "discrete" fraud crimes. Whereas
mail and wire fraud crimes become "complete" and trigger the
statute of limitations from the moment that the mails or wires are
used, bank frauds are measured in units of "execution."85 Depend-
ing on the context, conduct that serves as the basis of a bank fraud
prosecution (for example, opening an account) may be a compo-
nent of a defendant's execution of a scheme, or it may be a sepa-
rate execution (and therefore chargeable as a separate crime) alto-
gether.'
Whatever the legal label, from a practical perspective, we know
that many crimes, particularly frauds, take place over a period of
hours, months or years.87 Perpetrators need that time to devise
complex schemes, seduce and fool their targets, and obtain the ob-
jects of their illegal activity. Yet the criminal law does not take into
account the temporal aspects of most crimes, including fraud. In-
stead, it focuses almost exclusively on harm. Indeed, although
courts recognize each mailing or use of the wires as a separate of-
fense,' the Sentencing Guidelines aggregate the total intended or
actual loss from the entire scheme.89 For purposes of determining
the severity of the sanction, the presence of multiple mailings or
wires is effectively irrelevant; the loss amount (that is, the overall
"Compare United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that each mailing constitutes a separate violation of the mail fraud statute), and
United States v. Garlick, 240 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001) (reaching the same result
for wire fraud), with United States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("It is
settled law that acts in furtherance of the [bank fraud] scheme cannot be charged as
separate counts unless they constitute separate executions of the scheme .... and that
acts which do constitute individual executions may be charged separately. (cita-
tions omitted)).
Although an act that is a separate execution of a bank fraud scheme may be
charged separately, it may also be charged in a single count if the count provides the
defendant sufficient notice of the government's case and the "executions" can be
viewed "as parts of a single course of conduct." Bruce, 89 F.3d at 890; see also United
States v. King, 200 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that "each execution of a
scheme to defraud need not give rise" to a separate charge).
87 See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 711 (1989) (describing a used
car dealer's odometer fraud that spanned fifteen years as "an ongoing fraudulent ven-
ture").
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391,394 (1916).
89See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 (2007).
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harm) is what counts. As I demonstrate in Part III, however, a gov-
ernment intent on achieving deterrence is not well served by this
strategy. If deterrence is the goal, the government must account
both for the duration of the offense and for the various events that
may transpire and impact the law's ability to deter.
Like duration, the connectivity of a given offense is another
characteristic that criminal law more or less ignores, but which de-
terrence adherents must consider. Whereas some crimes are dis-
crete (for example, pocketing an apple from the local supermar-
ket), others are constructed from interlocking instances of conduct,
the cessation of which may increase or decrease the likelihood of
one's detection and punishment at any time.
In other words, some, but not all, crimes are "path dependent":
prior decisions foreclose otherwise rational or preferable future
decisions.' Path dependency is often discussed in the context of
corporate organizations or political institutions and comes about
when one person's earlier decisions necessarily foreclose otherwise
desirable options for later decisionmakers within the same organi-
zation or institution.9' Where crime is concerned, path dependency
is a bit different. Although prior decisions foreclose future ones,
the same person (the perpetrator) is responsible for all of them.
The temporal problems are caused not by the large depersonalized
nature of an organization or the randomness of multiple actors
making different decisions over time, but rather by the inherent na-
ture of certain criminal acts. The act of lying to someone now cre-
ates a commitment to lie later. Criminal path dependency thus re-
sults not from the nature of the actor, but from the nature of the
act.
Although crime is path dependent, it is unevenly dependent.
Some crimes can be terminated with little or no transition costs.
Others, such as fraud, are far more difficult to curtail once started.
As I explore below in more detail, the "path dependency" of the
o See Garoupa & Jellal, supra note 45, at 192-93 (noting the path dependent nature
of criminal conduct); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Effi-
ciency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash U. L.Q. 327, 329-30 (1996) (discuss-
in path dependence in a more general sense).
ISee, e.g., Gilson, supra note 90.
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crime is likely to be a function of its complexity, its opportunity for
exit, and its involvement of other people.'
The penalty structure of federal criminal law does not focus on
those factors that make criminal conduct more or less path de-
pendent. Rather, following the retributivist paradigm, criminal law
imposes increasingly serious penalties for corresponding levels of
harm. Where transition costs are low, the harm-based approach to
sentencing makes sense. If a robber stakes out a grocery store, then
enters the store with the intent of committing the crime, but walks
out empty-handed because he sees an armed guard, he is techni-
cally guilty of attempted robbery. If no one is aware of his intent,
however, he can abandon his course of conduct with little fear of
apprehension. Of course, he may encounter other drawbacks from
abandoning his plan. For example, he may have intended to use the
proceeds of the robbery to pay a gambling debt. The costs that flow
from his inability to repay his debts, however, are exogenous; they
are not an inherent aspect of the crime itself.
By contrast, financial accounting fraud is highly path dependent.
Once a perpetrator lies to his victims, he cannot extricate himself
from his lies without tipping someone off that his earlier state-
ments were grievously incorrect. Note that part of the problem
stems from the fact that the crime itself requires an interaction be-
tween the criminal and another person. The cessation of conduct
causes the victim to reconsider his prior interaction with the crimi-
nal. By contrast, unless a drunk driver is caught or injures some-
one, no one will ever know of her crime. Crimes that require no in-
teraction with other people (including victims) will feature fewer
linkage problems.
It is well-accepted that interactions between two or more crimi-
nals "make wrongdoing more likely to arise and can make it more
virulent once it begins."9 Group dynamics overcome the fear and
self-interest that might otherwise dissuade perpetrators at the last
minute. Linkage, however, extends that analysis to interactions be-
9 Of course, the length of the crime also may affect its path dependence, but I treat
"duration" as a separate factor affecting deterrence.
" Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1613,
1624 (2007).
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tween criminals and other people besides co-conspirators.94 The
presence of witnesses and victims, for example, may pose similar
roadblocks to laws designed to deter offenders from additional
criminal conduct.
In sum, two factors that criminal law often overlooks may have a
very important effect on the success of the marginal deterrence of
offenders: the practical duration of the offense, and its connec-
tivity.95 A graph of these two characteristics (duration versus "con-
nectedness" of the offense) might look like the following:
E.g.:
Burglary
Accounting fraud
Pickpocketing
DWI
Tax evasion
Embezzlement
Drug dealing
Connectivity
Figure 1
Although there has been discussion of how group dynamics increase the likeli-
hood and extent of harm, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 Yale L.J.
1307 (2003), the literature has not yet discussed the extent to which a perpetrator's
interaction with victims might increase the severity of harm because the victims' pres-
ence reduces the possibility for costless exit.
" I purposely refer to the first characteristic as the time necessary to obtain the ob-
ject of the offense and not the time it takes to complete the offense because, doctri-
nally, many crimes (including fraud) are considered "complete" long before the de-
fendant has obtained his expected object. The problems with this disconnect are
discussed supra, at notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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No doubt, beyond DWI and discrete theft crimes, many will
categorize crimes differently depending on their context. Drug
dealing, for example, need not be a particularly connected crime. A
dealer's sale of cocaine tomorrow need not be linked to his sale
yesterday. Nevertheless, because drug dealing occurs in groups
and, like any other business, often involves future agreements to
purchase or sell a product at a given price, it is a far more path de-
pendent crime than drunk driving. For that reason, it should come
as no surprise that attempts to deter drug dealing solely by relying
on sanctions or visibly increased enforcement often fail with crimi-
nals who are already in the midst of such activity when these
strategies are announced and implemented.96
This Article's contention is that many of the frauds that occur in
corporate settings fall squarely within the upper-right quadrant of
Figure 1. Corporate fraud occurs over long periods of time97 (long
enough for changes in legal policy to occur while perpetrators are
already in the midst of criminal schemes), and it inherently re-
quires interactions with other people. As a result, linkage problems
are likely to arise when lawmakers adopt strategies to deter corpo-
rate fraud. I explain this concept further and its interaction with
different law enforcement strategies in the sections below.
B. Fraud and Linkage
"Linkage," as defined in this Article, is the extent to which the
cessation of new criminal conduct increases the perceived likeli-
hood of detection and punishment for previous instances of crimi-
nal conduct. Before discussing linkage in more detail, it is helpful
to consider certain characteristics of criminal fraud. These charac-
teristics illuminate the linkage problem.
96See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons
from Economics, 1994 U. Chi. Legal F. 207, 220 (discussing the organizational dynam-
ics of drug dealing and ways in which "more intensive enforcement exacerbates"
drug-related crime).
7 This may be due in part to the very nature of the corporation. As decisionmaking
becomes more decentralized and compartmentalized, the perpetrator may need more
time to perfect his plan and achieve his objective.
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First, criminal fraud is easily completed, as a matter of federal
law.98 The bare-bones elements of fraud as defined by federal law
are: (a) a scheme to defraud someone of their money, property or
"honest services," and (b) the use of either the mails or interstate
wires (or other media, depending on the statute) to further that
scheme.9 The perpetrator need not have obtained the object of her
scheme, and the target need not have suffered any damages or
"loss" for the fraud to be considered "complete.
'
"
100
It is important to note that the ease of committing fraud is a
characteristic solely of federal criminal law.101 Common-law civil
fraud is far more difficult to prove and consequently more difficult
98I refer primarily to 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000)
(wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (bank fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000) (health
care fraud), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West Supp. 2007) (securities fraud), 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1349 (West Supp. 2007) (attempt and conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (conspir-
acy); and to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000) and
17 C.FR. 240.10b-5 (2000), promulgated under that Act. In the federal system, a sin-
gle scheme might support indictment under several or all of the above statutes. See,
e.g., United States v. Vought, No. 3:05cr268, 2006 WL 1662882 (D. Conn. June 15,
2006) (describing multiple fraud-related counts in indictment).
The elements of mail fraud and wire fraud are:
(i) a scheme to defraud that includes a material deception; (ii) with the intent to
defraud; (iii) while using the mails, private commercial carriers, and/or wires in
furtherance of that scheme; (iv) that did result or would have resulted in the
loss of money or property, or the deprivation of honest services.
Skye Lynn Perryman, Mail and Wire Fraud, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 715, 718 (2006)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341). Wire fraud also requires an interstate communication as an
element. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1343). To be found guilty of mail fraud, the defendant
need not even personally use the mails; it is sufficient to show that it was foreseeable
that the mails would be used in furtherance of the execution of the fraud. See Pereira
v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954); United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 857
(6th Cir. 2000).
" See Perryman, supra note 99, at 729; see also, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 64
F.3d 1465, 1478 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that the crime of wire or mail fraud is com-
plete "when any wiring or mailing is used in execution of a scheme; there is no re-
quirement that the scheme actually defraud a victim into investing money for the
crime to be complete"); United States v. Hickey, 16 F. Supp. 2d 223, 234 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) ("[T]he crime is complete upon the hatching of the scheme with the requisite
intent supplemented by the use of the mails.").
101 For scholarly commentary on both the breadth of the mail and wire fraud statutes
and the relative ease with which federal prosecutors can prove a violation of such
statutes, see Moohr, supra note 15, at 944 & n.41 (citing various accounts for the view
that mail fraud is a prosecutor's primary and best weapon against wrongdoers); see
also John Hasnas, Trapped: When Acting Ethically Is Against the Law 31-32 (2006).
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to commit." Unlike a federal prosecutor, a private individual seek-
ing monetary redress for a commercial fraud must show: (a) a false
statement (b) uttered by a defendant possessing a requisite amount
of scienter (knowledge and intent that the plaintiff act on that
statement), (c) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied (d) to the
detriment of the plaintiff.1 3 The federal definition of fraud essen-
tially jettisons the third and fourth requirements of common law
fraud. The prosecutor need not show reliance (much less "justifi-
able" reliance). Nor need she prove that the plaintiff (or anyone)
suffered detriment. " Whereas first year torts casebooks teach that
there is no such thing as "negligence in the air,"'"5 federal criminal
law demonstrates that "fraud in the air" is alive and well.
Because fraud is so easily "completed" as a legal matter, few
frauds are "attempts" (or, all attempts effectively are completed
crimes).1" This is the case despite the fact that both the U.S. Code
""As Christine Hurt has observed, the burden on civil plaintiffs seeking to prove
corporate fraud is much greater than the burden placed on prosecutors. Whereas
prosecutors may rely on aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories of liability, civil
plaintiffs are barred from using aiding and abetting theories and are likely to find con-
spiracy difficult to prove, under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See
Hurt, supra note 14, at 403-05.
103 See So. Dev. Co. v. Silva, 125 U.S. 247, 250 (1888), in which the Court split the
first and sccond elements into four and stated the complete test as follows:
That the defendant has made a representation in regard to a material fact...
[t]hat such representation is false;... [t]hat such representation was not actu-
ally believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be true;... [t]hat it
was made with intent that it should be acted on[;] ... [t]hat it was acted on by
[the plaintiff] to his damage; and,... [t]hat in so acting on it the [plaintiff] was
ignorant of its falsity, and reasonably believed it to be true.
Later courts have appended the requirement that the false statement "caused" the
plaintiff's detriment. For a discussion of this final element and the general require-
ments of a common law fraud claim, see John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 1001, 1001-02
(2006). For a comparison of the differences in prosecuting similar conduct under civil
and criminal fraud doctrines, see Hasnas, supra note 101, at 31-32; Hurt, supra note
14.
10 "A person can be guilty of wire or securities fraud without causing any loss at all,
for the essence of both crimes lies in the defendant's conduct, not in his or her success
in harming the intended victim." United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416,
425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Lynch, J.).105Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
106 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of
the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1983) (criti-
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and the Sentencing Guidelines contain provisions for "incomplete"
crimes, the sanctions for which are slightly less severe than for their
completed counterparts.1 Deterrence theorists praise the attempt
doctrine because it proscribes lesser sanctions for perpetrators who
voluntarily suspend their offense prior to its completion." The
doctrine is useful because it increases the potential criminal's prob-
ability of punishment, yet allows unsure perpetrators to abandon
their course of conduct before they have completed their crimes
and caused harm."
Where criminal fraud is concerned, however, the attempt doc-
trine offers little help to either perpetrators or their intended vic-
tims. Since criminal fraud is complete from the moment a scheme
is devised and a particular medium is first used (interstate wires,
mail, or securities filings), perpetrators retain little incentive to cur-
tail their frauds once their scheme has begun."' To the contrary,
cizing the breadth of mail fraud statute as inconsistent with inchoate crimes). "The
[wire fraud] statute punishes the scheme (more precisely, the use of the telephone or
cognate means of communication to conduct the scheme) rather than the completed
fraud.... It punishes, in short, the attempt to defraud." United States v. Coffman, 94
F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (citations omitted).
7 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1349 (West Supp. 2007) (attempt and conspiracy); U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines Manual § 2X1.1(b)(1) (2007) (decreasing the offense level for at-
tempts by three levels, "unless the defendant completed all of the acts the defendant
believed necessary for successful completion of the substantive offense or the circum-
stances demonstrate that the defendant was about to complete all such acts but for
apprehension or interruption of some similar event beyond the defendant's control.");
see also, e.g., United States v. DeFelippis, 950 F.2d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 1991) (conclud-
ing that a defendant was not entitled to a reduction in sentence under §2X1.1 because
he had completed all steps necessary to obtain a $250,000 loan through fraudulent
means). Section 1349 was added pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. It is un-
clear, however, why it was necessary. Conspiracy was already an offense under 18
U.S.C. § 371, and most fraudulent conduct already triggered the substantive fraud
statutes.
108 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 1193, 1217 (1985) (concluding that an attempted robber should receive a lesser
sentence than an actual robber, "to give offenders an incentive to change their minds
at the last moment"); see also Shavell, supra note 25, at 1241-43.
,0For an argument that lawmakers should sometimes grade more developed at-
tempts'less harshly than less-formed attempts, see Kramer, supra note 54, at 410-12
(arguing that reduction in sentence for "last-step" of attempt will encourage defen-
dants to desist from completing the attempt).
10 The Sentencing Guidelines further reduce this incentive by basing the perpetra-
tor's sentence on the perpetrator's intended loss and not his victim's actual loss. See,
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once the perpetrators in question send the letter, forward the
email, or submit the filing, they are legally culpable for the com-
pleted crime."'
Similarly, if two fraudsters concoct a conspiracy 1 2 to commit
fraud, the fraud is complete as soon as they agree to devise the
scheme and one of them commits a single act in furtherance of that
agreement."3 Regardless of whether perpetrators of fraud act in
concert or alone, they will trigger a completed offense quite easily.
Once they have tripped this alarm, they have little reason to aban-
don their plans: if they turn back, they remain subject to full, or
close to full, criminal liability and stand to gain little or nothing
from abandoning the scheme."'
As easily as fraud is commenced, it is difficult to terminate. Le-
gally, fraud terminates upon the perpetrator's "execution" of his
scheme. "5 As a practical matter, fraud does not end until the perpe-
trator safely exits from the scene with the object of his scheme in
hand. When the "object" of the crime includes the preservation of
one's employment, however, the fraud may never end until some-
one detects the employee's crime. "6 If a mid-level manager inflates
e.g., United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that a stock-
broker employee's liability for criminal fraud is properly based on the intended loss of
$400,000 and not the actual loss of $30,000).
.. The caveat is that the defendant may qualify for a reduction under U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Manual § 2X1.1. See discussion supra note 107.
12For an argument that conspiracy ought to remain a separate crime because perpe-
trators draw economic and psychological strength from groups (and thereby pose a
greater threat to society), see Katyal, supra note 94, at 1370-71.
113 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
1 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who "accepts responsibility" by
pleading guilty to an offense in advance of trial receives a slight reduction in his sen-
tence. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2007). This reduction, however, is
available to most defendants post-detection, up through and including a few weeks or
even days prior to trial. A separate departure exists for a defendant, where "moti-
vated by remorse, discloses an offense that otherwise would have remained undiscov-
ered." The disclosure cannot be prompted by the defendant's fear of detection. U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.16 (2007).
... A scheme to defraud terminates when it is "fully consummated." United States v.
Evans, 473 F.3d 1115, 1119 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Henderson v. United States, 425
F.2d 134, 141 (5th Cir. 1970)).
116 See United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F.Supp.2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (criti-
cizing the Sentencing Guidelines' approach to loss amount in fraud cases where the
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her revenue figures to improve her yearly commission and bonus,
she must continue deceiving her employer until she finds a way to
safely exit her job and obtain similar employment. This may be a
fairly difficult task.
Fraud also is not easily terminated because the probability of de-
tection often depends on the perpetrator's ability to continue mis-
leading the target. Unlike many other crimes, fraud is a crime in
which repeated conduct-at least temporarily-decreases the like-
lihood of apprehension."7
Imagine another mid-level manager, who works at a large public
corporation in the chemical industry. She is responsible for certify-
ing to her supervisor that her division has disposed of certain
chemicals properly. If Mid-Level Manager lies to her supervisor
about her division's compliance with environmental dumping laws
this year, she most likely has committed her division to continuing
that lie in the future. By filing a false certification, Mid-Level Man-
ager has painted a rosier picture about the cost of compliance than
is possible. If her division properly disposes of the chemicals next
year, the division's costs will increase and Mid-Level Manager's
supervisor will question her performance. Either Mid-Level Man-
ager will lose her job (the prevention of which was the reason she
lied in the first place) or, even worse, her supervisor will become
suspicious about her previous compliance and inquire further.
As the above example demonstrates, the failure of a perpetrator
to lie in future statements can cause his targets to suspect his pre-
vious statements. For this reason, it is not surprising that numerous
fraud cases include discussions of perpetrators engaging in "lull-
loss amount appeared to be a function of the employer's failure to catch the employee
and not the employee's interest in defrauding employer of a specific amount).
". See United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Each wiring
concealed and promoted each and every fraudulent series of transactions by making
the entire scheme less detectable."); United States v. Ashman, 979 F.2d 469, 483 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("[C]oncealment-in this case, the appearance of legitimate trading-
formed a vital part of the instant defendants' ongoing scheme [to collude fraudulently
on setting the price of soybean futures]. The mailing and wiring aided that conceal-
ment. They led customers to believe that the broker had attempted to obtain the best
price available in the market; they prevented customers from complaining that they
were not getting appropriate execution of their orders, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, they maintained the defendants' positions of trust as brokers and traders on
the [Chicago Board of Trade].").
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ing" activities (providing "follow-up" lies or interim "payments" to
investors) 8 designed to assure their targets that nothing is amiss."9
Some will note that Mid-Level Manager's repeated lying is not a
pure positive for her. Although lulling statements temporarily de-
lay the detection of the fraud, the aggregation of such statements
may, over time, increase the likelihood of Mid-Level Manager's de-
tection, and perhaps more importantly, conviction. Additionally,
the accumulation of lies may contribute to a larger sanction when
the fraud is eventually detected." Moreover, if Mid-Level Man-
ager directs these statements to federal officials (such as SEC em-
ployees), she may provide them with an easier road map for prose-
cution under either the false statement or obstruction statutes.21
For someone who discounts future events, however, the extension
"
8 See United States v. Barbera, No. 02 CR. 1268(RWS), 2005 WL 2709112, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2005) (citing fraud cases in which defendants remitted "payments"
that were "necessary ... for the scheme to continue"); see also H. Lowell Brown, Ex-
traterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. Int'l L. &
Com. Reg. 239, 307-10 nn.244-45 (2001) (discussing cases). For an argument that the
courts' willingness to accept lulling statements sent via the mails or wires has unduly
weakened the mail and wire fraud statutes' jurisdictional requirements, see Geraldine
Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 Syracuse L. Rev. 1127, 1157-
60 11997).
The Supreme Court observed this phenomenon in United States v. Lane, 474 U.S.
438 (1986):
Mailings occurring after receipt of the goods obtained by fraud are within the
statute [18 U.S.C. § 1341] if they "were designed to lull the victims into a false
sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and
therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mail-
ings had taken place."
Id. at 451-52 (quoting United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403 (1974) (rejecting sub-
sequent mailing as basis of mail fraud prosecution because it was irrelevant to the de-
fendant's execution of the scheme)); see also United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75,
80 (1962) ("[S]ubsequent mailings can in some circumstances provide the basis for an
indictment under the mail fraud statutes.").I201 am indebted to Professor Dan Richman for this observation.
,21 See Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 9,
36-37 (2005) (describing the benefits of prosecuting cover-ups); Daniel C. Richman &
William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pre-
textual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 590 (2005) (explaining why prosecutors
find it easier to prosecute defendants for cover-up crimes such as obstruction and per-
jury, as opposed to more complex crimes such a fraud and insider trading).
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of the fraud will appear far more positive than the increased likeli-
hood of conviction and additional sanctions in the future.
Lulling statements extend both the practical and legal life of a
scheme to defraud.122 Because courts measure the statute of limita-
tions l" from either the date of the last overt act on behalf of a con-
spiracy (if there is more than one perpetrator), or from the date of
the last act in furtherance of the scheme's execution (such that
"lulling" the victim is considered a part of the fraud's "execution"),
many frauds persist years after the perpetrator initially devised his
scheme. Lulling statements often fill the gap between the scheme's
creation and its ultimate detection and termination.
2 4
The third aspect of fraud that creates a "linkage" problem is that
fraud-particularly the type of scheme that is hatched in the work-
place-is likely to require the perpetrator's physical presence.
First, as discussed earlier, one of the primary objects of the perpe-
trator's fraudulent scheme is to maintain her position within the
company and her status and position within her community. Her
status and position, moreover, are likely to make it quite difficult
for her to flee successfully. 125 Accordingly, corporate fraud does not
permit the same exit opportunities as other types of fraud, such as
simple schemes that con artists perpetrate on near-strangers.
Second, although there are numerous crimes (including many
variations of online or credit card frauds) for which the perpetra-
""Mailings sent after the defendant has obtained the victim's money are consid-
ered 'in furtherance of the scheme' for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 if they facilitate
concealment of the scheme.... These mailings are commonly referred to as 'lulling
letters."' United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1352 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted). "[T]he scheme is not fully consummated, and does not reach fruition, until
the lulling portion of the scheme concludes." United States v. Evans, 473 F.3d 1115,
1120 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Sampson, 371 U.S. at 80-81).
123 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2000).
'24 See Brown, supra note 118 (discussing numerous instances of lulling statements
or statements that otherwise delayed detection of the fraudulent scheme). It should
be noted that a mail or wire fraud prosecution is within the statute of limitations if at
least one mailing or use of the wires occurred within five years of indictment, regard-
less of whether part or all of the scheme was devised prior to the five-year period. See
United States v. Howard, 350 F.3d 125, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
" See lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Hedge-Fund Fugitive Caught in Crete, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 21, 2007, at C3 (describing apprehension of perpetrator who fled the country
one day prior to his sentencing for defrauding investors through hedge fund Ponzi
scheme).
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tor's absence decreases the likelihood of detection, workplace
fraud is not one of them.126 Put another way, premature exit can
substantially increase the probability that a perpetrator will get
caught. If a CFO has been using "creative" accounting methods to
determine a company's profit, the last thing she wants to do is
move on to another job and thereby trigger the company's (and
public's) discovery of just how creative she has been. 27
In sum, as a practical matter, corporate fraud is not an instanta-
neous offense. Rather, it is a continuing one, which requires the
criminal's ongoing commitment and, in many instances, presence.
This, in turn, creates two additional problems.
First, because fraud inherently occupies an indistinct period of
time extending into the future, perpetrators of fraud may discount
both the magnitude of their commitment and the likelihood of be-
ing detected over the course of the crime. As a result, they may fail
to devise useful exit strategies. The CFO who lies to her company's
shareholders may estimate the short-term probability of detection,
but it is doubtful that she will consider how to carry her lies for-
ward an additional five years. Moreover, because she commits the
fraud in order to keep her job, it is less likely that the CFO has con-
sidered how she will exit her job if the situation changes.
Second, the continuing nature of this crime ensures that some
criminals will be in the midst of fraudulent schemes when new law
enforcement strategies are announced and implemented. As I ex-
plain in Part III, infra, these criminals, "mid-fraud perpetrators,"
will continue their criminal conduct regardless of changes in policy
because they fear detection and punishment for their previous
conduct." I describe their potential reactions to different law en-
forcement strategies in the next Part.
26 See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 714 (1989) (finding mailings essential
to a scheme involving sale of cars whose odometers had been fraudulently set back,
because they supported the defendant's "relationship of trust and goodwill with the
retail dealers upon whose unwitting cooperation his scheme depended").
,27 Despite his insistence that he did so for personal reasons, Jeffrey Skilling's resig-
nation as CEO of Enron in August 2001, just a few months after he had attained the
position, alerted Wall Street of possible issues with the company. See Laura Gold-
berg, Enron's New CEO Resigns Suddenly, Houston Chron., Aug. 15, 2001, at Al.
1 The commitment to lying may further hurt the company in other markets as well.
See Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Mar-
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III. LINKAGE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: FIVE STRATEGIES FOR
DETERRING FRAUD
The premise of this Article is that corporate fraud includes an
inherent characteristic-linkage-that complicates the govern-
ment's attempts to deter corporate fraud. Linkage does not affect
each law enforcement strategy equally. The following sections ex-
plore how linkage and timing impact five common law enforce-
ment strategies: (A) increased sanctions; (B) increased probability
of detection (announced); (C) increased probability of detection
(announced) combined with higher sanctions; (D) increased prob-
ability of detection (unannounced); and (E) amnesty or lenience
programs. 9
A. Strategy 1: Increase Sanctions
Although politicians often use deterrence language to justify in-
creases in criminal penalties, including the deterrence of those per-
petrators currently engaged in fraud, the strategy of increasing
sanctions to combat corporate fraud is the strategy least likely to
marginally deter mid-fraud perpetrators ("MFPs").
Imagine a CEO who lies to his shareholders about the com-
pany's financial health in its first quarter filings. Even if sanctions
increase prior to second quarter filings, the CEO is still likely to
persist in his fraud. This is so because: (a) the CEO will likely dis-
count the additional sanction; (b) the CEO is more willing, given
his situation, to gamble on a greater loss in order to avoid the more
certain loss that will occur if he suspends his lie; and (c) the new
sanction is probably not large enough to compensate for the in-
creased probability that he will be held liable for the old sanction if
the CEO terminates the fraud.
kets: Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 439, 440-41 (2006) (explaining how WorldCom's misrepresenta-
tions in securities filings also caused it to make inefficient pricing decisions in product
markets in order to match the company's misrepresentations).
129 This analysis assumes that both current and future perpetrators are aware that
the fraud in question violates well-defined legal norms, and does not address the
problems associated with changes in the content of criminal law.
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Whereas the first two factors (hyperbolic discounting and loss
aversion) have been discussed at length by proponents of behav-
ioral economic analysis," the third factor is simply an example of
the linkage that occurs between efforts to avoid liability for a
"new" crime and the likelihood of increasing the probability of de-
tection for another, "older" crime. Although this linkage may not
be present in all fraud cases, it certainly pervades securities and
other workplace frauds. It is exactly this linkage that creates a
commitment effect for perpetrators of fraud-even the ones who
are so "rational" as to calculate risk and reward perfectly.
For example, suppose that the CEO's initial estimated probabil-
ity of detection is 10%. Imagine further that the CEO's net benefit
from deceiving the company's shareholders is 1 million units, and
that the sanction, should he be caught and punished, (a combina-
tion of fines and imprisonment) is 2 million units."' With a 10%
probability of detection, the CEO will definitely commit the crime,
as indicated by the following model:
(1MM) > (10%)(2MM). '32
Now imagine that the government increases sanctions by a factor
of X, but does not increase the likelihood of detection. If the CEO
had never lied at all, he would decline to commit the crime if:
(1MM) < (10%)(2MM)(X).
Thus, if X exceeds 5 (a rather steep increase in sanctions), the
CEO will not commit the crime.
If the CEO has already lied to the company's shareholders as of
the day sanctions are increased by a factor of X, however, his cal-
culation changes, because the CEO perceives that cessation of his
conduct will increase the probability of detection for the old con-
,30 See generally Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 48.
'For purposes of this Article, I have defined the sanction in units equivalent to the
expected benefit. In real life, the perpetrator must convert the disutility of imprison-
ment and the perceived benefit of his conduct into an equivalent currency, which it-
self increases the risk of error.
,' Admittedly, this simplistic model does not consider the bounce-back effect of the
prevalence of white collar crime on the success of sanctions or probability of detec-
tion. For such an analysis and discussion, see Bar-Gill & Harel, supra note 40, at 495-
97.
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duct from 10% to Y%. Accordingly, when the CEO contemplates
whether to engage in new lies (to which the new sanctions apply),
he will balance the benefits of avoiding increased liability for his
old conduct (which exposes him to the "old" 2MM sanction)
against the drawbacks of incurring a new risk of liability for new
conduct (which exposes him to the "new" 10MM sanction). Ac-
cordingly, a CEO who is also a mid-fraud perpetrator (MFP) will
continue to lie if:
(Y%)(2MM) > (10%)(2MM)(X).
In the first example, when sanctions were increased by more
than a factor of 5, our potential fraudster declined to engage in the
crime because the increased sanction forced him to internalize the
costs of his wrongdoing.'33 But, unlike the potential fraudster, our
MFP does not compare the original benefit with the new expected
value of the penalty. Rather, our MFP quite reasonably worries
about avoiding sanctions for his prior conduct, for which he is li-
able regardless whether he ceases new conduct. Accordingly, the
left side of the inequality now includes the sanction that the MFP is
trying to avoid (2MM) multiplied by the new probability of pun-
ishment if he stops lying. Thus, even when sanctions are increased
by a factor of 5, the MFP will continue with the crime when the
linkage rate Y (as perceived by the CEO) exceeds 50%. For exam-
ple,
(51%)(2MM) > (10%)(2MM)(5).
As the above discussion demonstrates, the deterrent effect of the
new sanction is no longer grounded in forcing the CEO to internal-
ize the costs of his conduct. Instead, it is driven by the rapid in-
crease in probability of detection caused by the CEO's cessation of
conduct-the "linkage" factor.
Although some might question the magnitude of the linkage fac-
tor, it might be quite significant for fraud-related crimes. In fact, it
is quite possible that a CEO will perceive the linkage between end-
ing a fraudulent scheme and having it detected to be as high as
100%. That is, in the CEO's mind, the cessation of the fraud would
,' For the sake of simplicity, I treat the fraudster's harm and benefit as equivalents.
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inevitably result in punishment for those acts already committed,
but the continuation of the fraud is likely to go undetected, even
though it is now subject to higher sanctions. Anyone who has par-
ticipated in issuing public restatements of earnings will understand
the phenomenon. Shareholders (and investigators) who learn that
the company generated only 100 million dollars in profits in Quar-
ter 2 will immediately wonder why the same company was able to
generate substantially greater profits in Quarter 1. And if, acting
on this curiosity, shareholders ask the CEO about the difference in
quarterly profits, the CEO will find himself in the same quandary:
he is forced either to lie to the shareholders (and therefore become
subject to a new penalty) or to admit fraud in Quarter 1 (and suffer
the "older" penalty for his past fraud). If the CEO determines that
he would lie to the shareholders if questioned about the gap be-
tween Quarter 1 and Quarter 2 profits, he might as well lie about
Quarter 2 altogether and avoid the increased concerns about the
veracity of Quarter l's reported profits."M
When sanctions change while frauds are underway, rational
MFPs will include the value of the foregone sanction on the benefit
side of the scale in balancing the benefit of proceeding with the
crime against the expected cost. This is true even if the CEO has
already obtained the original benefit that was the target of the
crime and cannot obtain any additional benefit from new criminal
activity, which in reality is unlikely to be the case. Indeed, in situa-
tions where the CEO has not yet obtained the full expected benefit
of his original crime, he will have even more reason to continue ly-
ing because under the federal Sentencing Guidelines (which many
judges continue to follow voluntarily'35), the penalty is calibrated
134 This is obviously an oversimplified example of the CEO's expected punishment.
The release of false Quarter 2 earnings may cause greater shareholder loss (and
therefore a larger penalty) than the release of truthful Quarter 2 earnings paired with
a denial that Quarter 1 earnings were fraudulent. For simplicity's sake, I assume that
the sanctions are already so substantial that the extra penalty for additional lying has
been severely discounted.
,31 In 2005, the Supreme Court struck down the Guidelines in their mandatory form
as an unconstitutional encroachment on the defendant's jury trial right. United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005). Nevertheless, federal trial courts must sen-
tence defendants according to the general considerations laid out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2000), including the seriousness of the offense and the need for deterrence.
To carry out this responsibility, courts must calculate the defendant's Guideline sen-
1334 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 94:1295
according to intended loss, regardless of whether the criminal has
reaped his expected benefit.'36
True enough, the CEO's continued fraud may depend more on
his perception of linkage than the actual probability of getting
caught. If the CEO is unaware of a link between future and past
conduct, he may well fess up to bad numbers when it comes time to
report Quarter 2's financial numbers. On the other hand, assuming
that managers are well-informed and rational, they should have no
difficulty perceiving linkage and acting accordingly. "7
For the sake of simplicity, I have made several assumptions
throughout this analysis: that the MFP is lying to the same set of
victims, and that the MFP's lies are consistent enough that they do
not, of themselves, increase the likelihood of detection. These
characteristics are typical of corporate accounting fraud at a public
company: management lies to the shareholding public on a peri-
odic and repeated basis; and the individual lies, to the extent they
are grounded in a particular type of accounting trick, are more or
less consistent with each other until someone comes forward with
information about the trick.'38
tence range as a starting point. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007)
(citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)).
136See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 comment (n.3) (2007). If the ac-
tual or intended loss amount is indeterminate, courts may use the defendant's gain as
a measure for sentencing. See United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1099-1100
(8th Cir. 2005). Similarly, when deciding whether to proceed with the crime, the of-
fender also should take into account the likelihood that the government will detect
prior misconduct (and prior losses) along with the current one. See Bar-Gill & Harel,
supra note 40, at 490.
,, Other than Chris William Sanchirico (see supra note 16, at 1375-76), few scholars
have considered the effect on MFPs of increasing sanctions. An exception is Professor
Ribstein's discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox:
The Road to Nirvana, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 279, 285 ("[E]xecutives' incentives may
change after they take the first step to fraud. At this point they are motivated to en-
gage in cover-up. In other words, the law itself may discourage law compliance by
blocking the exit route. This suggests that rigid penalties for fraud may, to some ex-
tent, be counterproductive unless they take account of the cover-up incentive." (cita-
tion omitted)).
.3 The linkage implications and economics of continued lying will differ depending
on the type of fraud. For example, Internet and computer-driven frauds occur inter-
mittently and between strangers. Linkage may not be a concern for the perpetrators
of these scams. On the other hand, Ponzi schemes (whereby a perpetrator uses funds
illegally obtained from one victim to pay off another) are quite likely to implicate
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Before moving on to the second strategy (increasing the prob-
ability of enforcement), it is useful to pause for a moment and con-
sider several corollary points that arise from the study of linkage
and its effect on deterrence.
1. The Possibility of Additional Benefits
The above discussion concludes that an MFP will continue to de-
fraud others if the linkage probability, Y, multiplied by the original
sanction, S, exceeds the probability of detection, p, multiplied by S,
and by the factor increasing the sanction, X 39 Some may wonder
how and whether the possibility of additional benefits changes the
MFP's calculations.
The original discussion assumed that the MFP had already at-
tained her benefit and that there were no additional benefits that
she could obtain from continued conduct, other than avoiding the
sanction. It may be the case, however, that the MFP has not yet at-
tained all of the 1MM benefit at the time lawmakers announce an
increase in sanctions.4 ° Because criminals convicted of fraud are
punished on the basis of the harm they intend to inflict, the MFP
has every reason to capture any potential benefit (Br) that remains
available to her.1 4'2 Accordingly, the MFP will continue her fraud if:
(L)(S) + Br> (p)(S)(X).
linkage, but the course of lying (whereby the perpetrator must increasingly manufac-
ture new stories for an ever widening group of people) may cumulatively increase the
perpetrator's likelihood of detection. Accordingly, the creator of a Ponzi scheme will
engage in slightly different analysis from the typical corporate fraudster, who periodi-
calV lies to the same people (the shareholding public) again and again.
" If (L)(S) >(p)(S)(X), then the MFP will continue to commit the crime.
"For the purposes of my analysis above, I have assumed that benefit and loss are
equivalent. In reality, when the fraud pertains to a publicly owned company, the loss
amount is likely to dwarf the defendant's benefit. Cf. United States v. Adelson, 441 F.
Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (commenting on the stratospheric level of loss
when fraud concerns the value of shares of a publicly owned company).
41 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
142 1 assume that our MFP perceives a 100% likelihood of obtaining the remaining
benefit, based on her earlier fraudulent conduct. I also assume that the MFP's attempt
to recoup the remaining benefit has no effect on her probability of getting caught.
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It is also possible that the MFP sees a possibility of taking addi-
tional benefits (Ba) beyond the original 1MM, in which case the
fraud will continue if:
(L)(S) + Ba + Br > (p)(S)(X).
In the case of smaller frauds, it is possible that the MFP's seizure
of additional benefits will also increase her resulting sentence (the
"cost" of her conduct), which would result in little or no change in
her initial cost-benefit calculation. However, Ba may not signifi-
cantly add to the MFP's expected penalty if: (a) the base sanction,
S, is already so high that the disutility of any increase is minimal
and likely to be substantially discounted (the marginal deterrence
of an additional six months added onto a twenty-year sentence is
insignificant); (b) the MFP perceives a very low probability of de-
tection (reducing the value of any additional sentence) but a fairly
high probability of realizing the additional benefit; or (c) the sen-
tencing regime is one in which the sentence corresponds to a range
of losses or benefits, and the original conduct places the defen-
dant's conduct at the low end of the range.4 3 If any of these condi-
tions hold true, the MFP will have incentive not only to continue
with her fraudulent conduct, but also to seize as much additional
benefit as she can.
2. Fixing Mistakes
The reason the government must increase the sanction for fraud
in the first place is that it realizes that its initial combination of
sanctions and law enforcement is deficient. For example, 10% mul-
tiplied by 2MM was far less than the 1MM benefit available to the
potential fraudster.
143 For example, the Sentencing Guidelines set offense levels that correspond to cer-
tain ranges of losses. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b) (2007); see
also Katyal, supra note 46, at 2389 ("[E]xacting equal penalties for crimes of lesser
and greater magnitude leads to crimes of greater magnitude."). Accordingly, if an of-
fense level corresponds to any loss between $2.5 and $7 million, a defendant who has
taken $2.5 million has little reason to refrain from taking more money from his victim,
up to an amount that triggers the next offense level.
2008] Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud
Notice, however, that the government's starting point greatly af-
fects its ability to correct itself. For example, consider two law en-
forcement regimes that yield the same expected penalty:
Regime 1: 1% probability of punishment and a 20MM sanction,
which yields an expected penalty of 0.2MM.
Regime 2: 50% probability of punishment and a 0.4MM sanction,
which also yields an expected penalty of 0.2MM.
In either case, the penalty's expected value is 0.2MM and the
criminal's expected benefit is 1MM. Under either regime, the po-
tential fraudster commits the crime.
If the government attempts to correct its initial stance by in-
creasing either its enforcement efforts or the original penalty so
that the penalty's expected value rises to more than. 1MM (the ex-
pected benefit), the linkage problem produces radically different
outcomes for MFPs under the two regimes. Consider an MFP who
has already committed a crime under Regime 1. To increase the
expected penalty, the government vastly expands its enforcement
efforts in order to increase the probability of detection. Unfortu-
nately, these efforts are unlikely to deter an MFP who perceives
100% linkage between cessation of conduct and likelihood of de-
tection and punishment. The government's correction will not de-
ter the MFP because his cessation of conduct exposes him to a
20MM sanction. Because the benefit of avoiding the 20MM sanc-
tion is much greater than the new expected penalty under a height-
ened enforcement regime (recall that the government sought to in-
crease it to more than 1MM, the expected benefit), the MFP will
continue to commit the crime.
Suppose instead that the government has Regime 2 in place and
adjusts the sanction so that it yields an expected value of 1MM.
Assume further that the new sanction will not apply to the MFP if
he ceases his conduct. In this situation, our hypothetical MFP con-
fronts a choice between a sanction of 0.4MM (if he ceases his
fraudulent conduct) and an expected penalty of 1MM if he contin-
ues it. In this situation, the rational MFP will discontinue the
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fraud.'" The government's correction to Regime 2 meets its goal of
deterrence.
In sum, the government's starting point matters as much as its
end point. When linkage is high and the government is uncertain of
the sanctions necessary to deter criminal conduct, it may be better
served by an initial strategy of relatively low sanctions paired with
a high probability of detection and punishment. Although increas-
ing the likelihood of detection is costly because it requires the state
to expend resources on different types of regulators and enforce-
ment agents (as well as technology), the opposite strategy-high
sanctions paired with a low probability of enforcement-is far
more difficult to correct.
3. Retroactivity
Some may wonder how the non-retroactivity doctrine affects this
analysis. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution prohibits
statutes that criminalize or increase penalties for conduct that pre-
ceded the legislature's enactment of those penalties. 5
Although scholars often defend the Ex Post Facto Clause on
normative grounds,' 6 it also has a basis in deterrence theory: it en-
courages individuals who previously engaged in disfavored activi-
ties to refrain from repeating such conduct. Were those individuals
subject to newly heightened sanctions for conduct that preceded
the announcement of those sanctions, they would have no incen-
tive to cease such conduct and they would attempt to snatch up as
many benefits as they could prior to detection.'47 If a perpetrator
'" Of course, loss aversion, sunk cost fallacies, and the MFP's belief that he can ob-
tain additional benefits may undermine the corrected regime's deterrent effect, but
those are different problems.
"' "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed [by Congress]." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
"6 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Le-
gality, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 335, 351-53 (2005); Peter Westen, Two Rules of Legality in
Criminal Law, 26 Law & Phil. 229, 235 (2007).
',' The reason why these laws are so universally condemned is, that they overlook
the great object of all criminal law, which is, to hold up the fear and certainty of
punishment as a counteracting motive, to the minds of persons tempted to
crime, to prevent them from committing it. But a punishment prescribed after
an act is done, cannot, of course, present any such motive.
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previously miscalculated the costs and benefits of a given course of
conduct (for example, drunk driving), a new, harsher sanction
alerts her that the costs (such as the potential loss of human life)
are far greater than she presumed, and she can terminate her con-
duct costlessly. In doing so, she avoids all penalties (both new and
old) for her conduct, since presumably no one observed her driving
drunk in the past.
The calculation is not nearly so easy for an MFP or any other
criminal who has committed a crime where linkage is present. Sup-
pose that an MFP conducts a corporate accounting fraud scheme
without the aid of others.' 8 If she terminates the scheme before the
new penalty goes into effect, she will incur no risk for the new pen-
alty, even if her prior fraud is detected. Under the ex post facto
doctrine, the "old" fraud will be subject only to the "old" penalty.
If she wishes to avoid all penalties, however, (like our drunk driver
in the example above), our MFP is out of luck. Because she has a
continuing obligation to communicate with her company's employ-
ees and shareholders about the company's financial position, our
MFP's only choices are to continue to lie (and risk liability under
the new penalty), or to tell the truth (and raise the likelihood of de-
tection to 100% or nearly so).'4 9 Accordingly, linkage undermines
the Ex Post Facto Clause's contribution to marginal deterrence.
4. Draconian Sanctions
Some lawmakers might conclude that the linkage problem is
merely one of degree. Increasing sanctions for a given crime still
might do the trick, provided the government increases them
enough to overcome the defendant's perception of linkage. If sanc-
tions skyrocket, the difference between the sanction for the "old"
Warren v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Jacquins v.
Commonwealth, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 279, 281 (1852)).
'" If the MFP was party to a fraud conspiracy, she theoretically could terminate li-
ability under the new statute by withdrawing from the conspiracy prior to the enact-
ment of the new penalty. Withdrawal, however, is both legally and practically diffi-
cult. The defendant must either notify authorities of the conspiracy's aims or
communicate her withdrawal to all of her co-conspirators. See, e.g., United States v.
Greenfield, 44 F.3d 1141, 1149-50 (2d Cir. 1995).
,' She also might quit her job. A replacement employee, however, would likely find
the fraud that our MFP perpetrated.
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crime and the sanction for the new one should overcome the detec-
tion probabilities generated when the perpetrator ceases lying.
There are, however, several problems with the "draconian sanc-
tions" strategy. First, it is costly. In addition to increasing prison
costs, it increases prosecution costs, because a perpetrator is more
likely to exercise his right to a jury trial if a guilty plea would net an
extremely long prison sentence. It also increases detection costs
because it effectively alerts current and future offenders to take
additional steps to hide their frauds.
1 50
Second, draconian sanctions may trigger an "inverse sentencing
effect," whereby the public perceives certain sentences as dispro-
portionate or unwarranted."' Witnesses may offer less assistance to
investigators, juries might acquit more corporate defendants, and
judges might rule against prosecutors more often on pre-trial mat-
ters or go out of their way to lessen the corporate defendant's sen-
112tence.
Third, even when the strategy technically overcomes linkage
costs, it fails to take into account "loss aversion." Loss-averse
MFPs may be willing to risk a much larger loss (the draconian
sanction) to avoid a smaller, but more certain loss (the sanction for
the "old" fraud). '5 3
Fourth, and perhaps most upsetting, the draconian sanction
strategy may increase the scope and extent of the underlying harm.
IS0 See Sanchirico, supra note 16, at 1338 ( "[H]iking up sanctions on securities fraud
encourages violators to exert more effort avoiding detection of their securities
fraud....").
s ' Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 26, at 1185; see also Edward K. Cheng,
Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 655, 660
(2006) (observing that draconian sentences for relatively minor offenses may trigger
inverse enforcement effects because they "insult[] common intuitions of desert").
12 For a recent example of a court's unsuccessful attempt to significantly reduce the
sentences of two individuals convicted of a $100 million fraud, see Mark Hamblett,
Sentences Reversed for Parties in $100 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18,
2008, at 1 (describing the Second Circuit's overruling of a district court's drastic re-
duction of Guidelines sentences for a former Days Inn general counsel and CFO who
were convicted of a multi-million dollar fraud scheme). Theoretically, lawmakers and
prosecutors might overcome inverse sentencing effects by educating the public on the
linkage problem and the need for draconian sanctions sufficient to overcome linkage
effects. Of course, the public might reject this justification.
' Loss aversion is discussed at length in Baker, Harel & Kugler, supra note 32, at
453-55.
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Because draconian sanctions force the MFP to bear additional risk
or reduce that risk through costly detection avoidance measures,
the MFP may compensate for those costs by seizing more benefits
than he originally intended."M In other words, the MFP will steal
more and use more deceptive efforts to do so than he otherwise
would have in order to compensate for draconian sanctions that he
previously failed to take into account.
In Part II, I argued that fraud is a crime that often takes place
over a period of time. The longer the duration of fraud, the greater
likelihood that society will impose changes in law enforcement
strategy or sanctions while the fraud is ongoing. Increased sanc-
tions-even (or especially) draconian ones-may have the perverse
effect of encouraging mid-fraud perpetrators to expand their frauds
and to do so in a manner that makes them more difficult to de-
tect.'
5. Detection Avoidance
Detection avoidance describes the efforts criminals take in order
to avoid detection and punishment. Recently discussed in great de-
tail by Professor Sanchirico, the detection avoidance principle
holds that as the expected value of a penalty increases, so too does
the value of avoiding detection."6 Visible increases in sanctions and
enforcement encourage some criminals to invest in detection
avoidance. In doing so, they increase the social costs of crime. "7
Linkage advances the discussion of detection avoidance by pre-
dicting the types of crimes most likely to trigger avoidance activi-
'5 As he increases the amount he steals, the MFP also increases the base amount for
his sanction. This increase, however, may be quite small if the probability of enforce-
ment is low. Moreover, if the MFP is engaged in a corporate fraud worth millions of
dollars, the base amount is already so high that the marginal increase in his sanction is
quite negligible. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2007) (pro-
viding the sentencing table for measuring offense level for economic crimes).
' I have discussed this elsewhere with regard to corporate compliance programs.
See Miriam H. Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 Ind. L.J. 1035, 1059(2008).
,56 Sanchirico, supra note 16, at 1337 (citing, e.g., Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screen-
ing and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J. Econ. 341, 341-42 (1990)); see also
Jacob Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach, Controlling Avoidance: Ex Ante Regulation
Versus Ex Post Punishment, 4 Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 46 (2008).
' Sanchirico, supra note 16, at 1363-64.
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ties in response to increased enforcement and sanctions. Indeed,
the MFP's continuation of his fraud is itself a specific form of de-
tection avoidance. The only difference from "traditional" detection
avoidance conduct is that the MFP avoids detection by generating
additional lies instead of destroying records or bribing potential
witnesses. The lies cover his tracks much like a paper shredder de-
stroys relevant documents.' Moreover, just as higher sanctions fail
to deter the MFP, so too do the laws and sanctions aimed at deter-
ring detection avoidance (referred to in the enforcement world as
either "obstruction" statutes or penalty enhancements). '59 As Pro-
fessor Sanchirico explains:
There is... no logical end to this rhetorical see-you-and-raise-
you. Every additional assertion that the state can also sanction
the next order of cover-up, newly encouraged by the last order of
sanctioning, is defeated by the retort that, in that case, the detec-
tion avoider will more strenuously cover up the next order of
cover-up in response.160
Professor Sanchirico suggests that instead of ratcheting up detec-
tion avoidance sanctions, lawmakers should focus on reducing the
"productivity" of detection avoidance efforts.61 Sanchirico relies
primarily on evidentiary rules that exploit defendants' cognitive
shortcomings.62 For example, it is more difficult to lie to a regula-
tor if she surprises you with a visit or phone call. But there are al-
ternative techniques1 63 that may be more effective in reducing the
"productivity" of detection avoidance and continued lying. I dis-
cuss them at length with regard to Strategies 4 and 5 below.
"'Admittedly, the additional detection avoidance techniques (like the additional
lies) may cumulatively increase the MFP's likelihood of punishment. Nussim & Tab-
bach, supra note 156, at 51. I am assuming that this increase, however, pales in com-
parison to the increase in probability that occurs when the offender terminates his
conduct.
'See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518 (2000) (criminalizing obstruction-related of-
fenses such as witness intimidation and destruction of records); U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2007).
,6" Sanchirico, supra note 16, at 1339.
.6 Id. at 1387.
162 Id. at 1395.
163 See Part III.D, Strategy 4 and 5, infra.
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B. Strategy 2: Increase the Probability of Punishment
If increased sanctions fail to deter fraud, lawmakers might re-
spond instead by increasing (or attempting to increase) the of-
fender's probability of punishment. This is most easily accom-
plished by increasing the probability of detection. Although more
costly than an increase in monetary sanctions, this strategy is often
invoked as preferable on the ground that criminals respond more
readily to shorter, more likely sanctions than they do to longer
sanctions that are more remote.
One problem with this strategy is that it is difficult to calibrate
and control. If a lawmaker wants to increase penalties by 100%,
she can simply vote for an increase of that amount, notwithstand-
ing the political fallout of doing so.165 Increasing probability of de-
tection, however, is not so straightforward. It may require an in-
crease in the number of government agents, in the quality of those
agents, in the technology that those agents will use, or some com-
bination of all three (and other) factors. It may even necessitate a
change in the substantive and procedural laws that regulate crimi-
nal conduct. Moreover, while a lawmaker knows whether she has
increased a given sanction for specified conduct, it might take years
for her to find out if an increase in allocation of resources actually
resulted in increased probability of detection."
The strategy of increasing detection nevertheless retains one
particular benefit over the strategy of increasing sanctions.
Whereas the government must publicly announce increases in
164 See Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Crimi-
nal Deterrence, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 55, 59 n.27 (2001) (citing studies).
165 Of course, the calculation is not so simple. Even if the legislature raises the pen-
alty by 100% and strips courts of their discretion to mete out any lesser sentence, the
legislature is nevertheless dependent on prosecutors to institute charges. See Meares,
Katyal & Kahan, supra note 26, at 1185.
1 Arguably, similar problems could pervade the strategy of increasing sanctions,
particularly if criminals are initially unaware that sanctions have in fact increased. See
Beres & Griffith, supra note 164, at 60. However, given the media attention surround-
ing increases in economic crime penalties, as well as the fact that corporate executives
receive regular briefings from in-house and external attorneys, corporate awareness
of new sanctions seems likely to be quite prompt.
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sanctions,"' it retains more flexibility in how it increases the likeli-
hood of punishment and how it publicizes that increase."'
With regard to the method of increasing probability of punish-
ment, the government can focus on different phases of criminal en-
forcement. It can hire more agents to detect fraud; enact (within
constitutional limits) evidentiary rules that make it more likely that
defendants will be convicted of fraud; or amend penalty statutes to
reduce judicial discretion (mandatory minimum sentences, for ex-
ample, make a term of punishment more likely without explicitly
increasing the sanctions for a given offense).
The government also may turn to a different type of enforce-
ment, often referred to as situational crime prevention ("SCP").
SCP, primarily discussed in the context of street crime, attempts to
reduce crime by eliminating opportunities for crime. 69 Instead of
enforcing laws by detecting and sanctioning violations, SCP re-
moves or severely curtails the opportunity to commit the crime in
the first place.
The government also has some flexibility, within democratic and
constitutional limits, as to how it announces the methods by which
it intends to increase the probability of punishment. For example,
the government might rely on a task force of undercover agents
and cooperating defendants to infiltrate conspiracies or particular
industries suspected of fraud. These operations increase the likeli-
hood of detection, but the government may not announce them un-
til they have reached some logical end point, presumably the very
public arrest of a number of perpetrators.
Despite this flexibility, numerous arguments in favor of trans-
parency push the government in the direction of noisier law en-
167 The obligation to disclose penalties publicly is often discussed as part of the "le-
gality principle" under which "criminal liability and punishment can be based only
upon a prior legislative enactment of a prohibition that is expressed with adequate
precision and clarity." Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law: Case Studies and Controver-
sies 47 (2005).
"' "Ordinarily, enforcement strategies are closely guarded secrets, since disclosure
undermines their efficacy and deterrence value." Cheng, supra note 151, at 686 (ob-
serving that the IRS does not publish the formulas on which it relies to audit taxpay-
erI IFor more detailed discussions of SCP, see Brown, supra note 67, at 349-50;
Cheng, supra note 151, at 662-4.
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forcement. Widely announced increases in detection and punish-
ment deter potential criminals and assure society that the govern-
ment cares about such activity and has a plan to eliminate it. Con-
spicuous increases in detection may convince potential criminals
not to engage in a particular crime either because they determine
that the likelihood of getting caught is too high or because visible
detection efforts "teach" potential criminals that society looks
down upon this particular course of conduct.
Visible increases in detection may also encourage noncriminals
to come forward with evidence of wrongdoing, either because of an
increased sense of moral outrage or because they are less fearful
that they will be the subject of retaliation if they cooperate with the
government.17 Whistleblowers should be more likely to go to the
FBI or the SEC if they think the government is serious about
cracking down on fraud. Shareholders will more willingly invest in
corporations if they believe that the government is protecting the
markets' integrity. Finally, noisy enforcement techniques support
democratic values. Society can make better and more informed de-
cisions as to who it elects to power if it knows how its elected offi-
cials are using that power.17' Society can also more easily abandon
those strategies it finds repugnant or inefficient if it knows that
they are being used. Undercover enforcement techniques threaten
these democratic checks on authority.
170For a discussion of how the crime rate links to fears of retaliation by victims and
witnesses, see Bar-Gill & Harel, supra note 40, at 489. Gerard Lynch has written per-
suasively about the more general effect of visible law enforcement on cultural norms:
"The public punishment of those who violate [societal] norms enables the law-abiding
to define themselves as such in contrast to those who are not, and, not incidentally,
reinforces the view that those who comply with the law are not saps or dupes, but the
righteous and respected majority." Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in
Policing Corporate Misconduct, Law and Contemp. Probs., Summer 1997, at 23, 46-
47 (explaining that public enforcement of criminal law is necessary to remind "good
citizens" that "society at large continues to abide by [the basic norms of the cul-
ture]").
171 Bruce D. Pringle, Comment, Present and Suggested Limitations on the Use of
Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcemcnt, 41 U. Colo. L. Rev. 261, 261
(1969) ("[T]he methods used by secret agents and informers are inconsistent with a
truly free society.").
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However, noisy promises to hunt down suspects or clean up an
entire industry can backfire.'72 If, despite its promises, the govern-
ment fails to increase detection and conviction rates, it will lose
credibility and undermine future compliance with the law. More-
over, as discussed below, noisy law enforcement may cause "cur-
rent" perpetrators to dig in deeper-either by covering up prior
crimes or inflating future harms to pay for increased risk of detec-
tion.
Imagine the hypothetical CEO discussed in the preceding sec-
tion. He still gains a 1MM benefit from the crime, and the sanction
remains constant at 2MM units. Now, however, the probability of
detection, previously 10%, is multiplied by a factor of X'. The
CEO will commit his crime if:
1MM > (X')(10%)(2MM).
As was the case with Strategy 1, if the probability of detection and
punishment is increased by a factor of 5 or more, potential crimi-
nals should be deterred. MFPs, however, may continue their con-
duct, depending on their perception of linkage. As was the case
with the increased sanctions strategy, the MFP will compare the
value of the foregone sanction with the expected value of the pun-
ishment, and will proceed with the crime if:
(Y%)(2MM) > (5)(10%)(2MM).
Again, if the linkage factor (Y) exceeds 50%, even a five-fold in-
crease in probability of enforcement is insufficient to marginally
deter the MFP.
C. Strategy 3: Increased Sanctions and Probability of Punishment
Thus far, I have considered increases in sanctions and probabil-
ity of punishment separately. The two variables, however, are ar-
guably interdependent. Significant increases in penalties are likely
to increase the probability of detection, because law enforcement
officials have greater incentives to investigate and prosecute crimes
172 Nagin, supra note 56, at 34.
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that result in longer and more serious sanctions.'73 Moreover, as a
practical matter, legislators rarely announce an increase in sanc-
tions without also suggesting (or outright ensuring) that enforce-
ment efforts simultaneously will increase. Although the Economic
Crime Package of 2001 that increased Guideline sentences for eco-
nomic crimes was not accompanied by any announced increase in
enforcement, the Bush administration soon attempted to remedy
that by substantially increasing the SEC's enforcement budget and
announcing the formation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force in
2002.74
So how would an MFP respond to increases in both sanctions
and probability of detection? Combining the five-fold increases
outlined in subsections A and B above, he will continue the fraud
if:
(Y%)(2MM) < (5)(10%)(5)(2MM).
This simplifies to:
(Y%)(2MM) < (5MM).
Even if the linkage factor is 100%, an MFP still should be deterred
from further crime. Thus, a strategy that increases both sanctions
and probability of detection may overcome the problem posed by
173 "Given scarce resources and the need to prioritize workloads, one factor that in-
evitably affects investigators and prosecutors is the ultimate punishment the alleged
criminal offender can expect to receive." Cohen, supra note 29, at 511; see also
Craswell, supra note 40, at 2187 ("In most contexts in which enforcement is imper-
fect.., the probability of punishment any particular defendant faces depends in part
on the nature of his or her violation. That is, in most legal regimes, defendants who
commit only marginal offenses are less likely to be punished than those who commit
more serious or egregious ones."). Craswell contends that "multiplier mechanisms,"
designed to account for less-than-perfect enforcement are optimal only if calculated
on a case-by-case basis to reflect differing likelihoods of detection across a defendant
population. ld. at 2187-88.
174 For the establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task Force, see Exec. Order No.
13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002). For a discussion of the increase in the SEC's
budget, see Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why the United
States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 1, 51-52 (2005)
("In response to the public outcry over the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress...
increased the SEC's budget almost 33 percent to $716 million in 2003, from the $540 mil-
lion that it received in 2002.") (citing Stephan Taub, SEC Boosting Big-Company
Caseload, CFO.com, Mar. 9,2004, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3012481).
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linkage. '75 Notice, however, that this combination of deterrence
strategies requires that law enforcement agencies expend substan-
tial effort and money. Voters may well balk at such outlays of re-
sources. Lawmakers therefore should consider whether alternative
strategies can achieve the same effect at lesser cost.
D. Strategy 4: Undercover Enforcement
Although the government cannot "quietly" increase sanctions, it
can quietly increase the probability of detection through covert law
enforcement measures such as undercover investigations and
stings. '76 It can also create semi-covert increases in detection by
generally promising greater surveillance and undercover measures
without specifying exactly how or when such surveillance will take
place."' An announced increase in tax audits without any further
explanation falls within this category.
Undercover police activities do not trigger linkage problems. If
an investigation is truly "undercover," the MFP has no idea it ex-
ists and therefore has no reason to change her course of conduct.
Undercover activities do, however, pose an entirely different set of
... When a linkage factor of Y exists, lawmakers should attempt to set the probabil-
ity of the foregone sanction equal or less than the increased sanctions and enforce-
ment. If X is the factor by which sanctions and probability of enforcement are multi-
plied, then (Y)(S) = (M)(p)(S). M therefore must be at least as large as Y divided by
p. For example, if linkage is very high (100%) and the initial probability of enforce-
ment is very low (1%), the government must increase overall enforcement (probabil-
ity and sanctions) by a factor of 100. It can split that multiple among sanctions (in-
creasing them by 10 times as much) and enforcement probability (also increasing the
probability by a factor of 10) or it could load the entire multiple onto one variable
(for example, by imposing a new sanction that is 100 times as large as the original
sanction).
76 An undercover investigation may include instances in which government agents
simply observe criminal conduct, or it may include a "sting" whereby government
agents (or cooperating defendants acting under the government's direction) orches-
trate and participate in the conduct that they are observing. See Bruce Hay, Sting
Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 387, 396 (2005)
(describing the difference between stings and "pure surveillance"). For a discussion of
"undercover work" and its common justifications, see Christopher Slobogin, Deceit,
Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by Police, 76 Or. L. Rev. 775, 778-79 (1997).
' See Cheng, supra note 151, at 686 & nn.177-78 (observing that police officers
"routinely discuss speeding enforcement policies and release the dates and locations
subject to heightened attention") (citing sources).
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problems, including corruption of law enforcement agents, en-
trapment of innocent targets, and spillover effects such as the crea-
tion of distrust both within the targeted community and between
law enforcers and citizens."8 Nevertheless, depending on how it is
executed, the strategy may offer a potentially more effective means
of incapacitating current offenders of "linked" crimes such as cor-
porate fraud."9 Because the investigation is covert and aimed at
current perpetrators of fraud, it avoids the linkage problem dis-
cussed above. To the extent that it eliminates the need for draco-
nian sanctions, it also avoids externalities such as overdeterrence of
corporate executives."O
Consider a situation in which the probability of detection in-
creases, but the government does not announce the increase. For
example, suppose that the government becomes aware of a public
company's fraud through a whistleblower and urges the whistle-
blower, a current employee, to attend and secretly tape meetings in
178 See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 646 (describing the negative effects of using coop-
erating defendants to further undercover investigations of street crimes). "Because
[secret agents and informers] take advantage of a suspect's trust and confidence, they
create an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion which adversely affects freedom of
speech and association." Pringle, supra note 171, at 261. See also Hay, supra note 176,
at 397 (analyzing undercover stings' potential for entrapment of otherwise law-
abiding individuals).
179 Although undercover enforcement is often disdained, it has been repeatedly accepted
as an integral method of combating wrongdoing. See, e.g., Pringle, supra note 171, at 261
("[A]fter denouncing [deceitful] police practices, most authors ultimately conclude that
informers and secret agents are a necessary component of law enforcement."). "The use of
undercover techniques... is essential to the detection, prevention, and prosecution of
white collar crimes, public corruption, terrorism, organized crime, offenses involving con-
trolled substances, and other priority areas of investigation." The Attorney General's
Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations 1 (May 30, 2002),
available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf. "This technique is a critically
effective means of investigating organized, clandestine, sophisticated criminal activity
which is not readily susceptible to detection by traditional investigative techniques." Jay B.
Stephens, Setting the Sting, Minimizing the Risk: The Government's Case for an Effective
Undercover Investigative Technique, Crim. Just., Summer 1986, at 14.
1
°Note, however, that employees and managers may become less informative or
explicit with each other if they perceive the possibility that they are being "watched"
or "reported" by someone else. Cf. Steven D. Clymer, Undercover Operatives and
Recorded Conversations: A Response to Professors Shuy and Lininger, 92 Cornell L.
Rev. 847, 852 (2007) (noting that "it is common for criminals to discuss their trade
ambiguously or in code" in order to avoid revealing information to undercover po-
licemen).
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which the company's CEO and upper-level management discuss
the details of their fraud.8 ' Because he is blissfully unaware of the
government's investigation, the CEO will continue his fraud until
he obtains his benefit, 1MM, and devises an appropriate exit or
termination strategy." He is no more likely to take any additional
steps to avoid detection than he would be absent the investigation.
Accordingly, an unannounced increase in resources directed to-
wards detection should result in the government's apprehension of
more MFPs.
It should be noted that although the undercover strategy avoids
linkage problems, it does not marginally deter MFPs; it provides no
incentive for them to cease their fraudulent conduct voluntarily.
However, it will at least incapacitate them. In addition, once a per-
petrator is apprehended, the strategy may produce a less costly
conviction and make up for the expense of the investigation. The
evidence of the crime (for example, video or audio tapes of the
CEO outlining the fraud) will be more compelling than the tradi-
tional historical narrative that prosecutors often must construct
piecemeal from cooperating witnesses and documents that are dif-
ficult to understand."' Moreover, to the extent that corporate fraud
is committed by groups rather than individuals, the undercover
strategy may be more effective in identifying the entire member-
ship of that group, ' whereas noisier strategies may permit the
most "protected" members of the group to scatter and reform
later. During the investigative phase, the undercover strategy fails
not only to marginally deter MFPs, but also to deter potential of-
fenders. Despite this drawback, the strategy might well pay off for
the government if: (a) it is successful in apprehending MFPs, and
(b) when it does apprehend them, the government announces with
... This was the government's strategy in its investigation of Archer Daniels Midland
for its participation in an international price-fixing conspiracy. See Kurt Eichenwald,
The Informant (2000).
82 Whether he can devise such a strategy, or whether he irrationally decides to stay
at the company indefinitely, is another matter.
183 Hay, supra note 176, at 388 (observing that stings "eliminat[e] many of the evi-
dentiary difficulties of ordinary law enforcement").
84 Bar-Gill & Harel, supra note 40, at 490 ("When criminality is organized in
groups, police surveillance or interrogation of one criminal may lead to the apprehen-
sion of other members of the same criminal group.").
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great fanfare that it has done so. Following such an announcement,
both potential offenders and victims will accept as credible the
government's claim of increased enforcement.'
Bruce Hay has discussed the tension between what he calls the
"informational" and "deterrent" value of undercover investiga-
tions." Whereas informational investigations seek to identify
criminals and trap them in the government's sting operation, deter-
rent investigations are designed to deter potential criminals from
participating in the crime at all." Although the tension between in-
formation-gathering and deterrence seems quite real, it can also be
overcome by careful planning. In the ideal world, while the investi-
gation remains covert, the government increases its ability to iden-
tify and incapacitate current offenders (the "informational" goal).
Then, when it has acquired sufficient information, the government
can arrest its targets, publicize the investigation, and begin deter-
ring future offenders (the "deterrent" goal).
Apart from its enforcement costs, the undercover strategy's
greatest drawbacks may be the ones most difficult to quantify. Un-
dercover strategies may offer increased risks of abuses of power
because law enforcement operations are, by definition, conducted
in secret." Even when they are conducted in accordance with pre-
scribed rules, such practices may perpetuate distrust and even a
disdain for the rule of law, thereby undermining normative calls for
compliance."
' "A natural effect of permitting covert police activity-and publicizing the fact-is
to make individuals fear that they may be under surveillance without knowing it."
Hay, supra note 176, at 411.
6 Id. at 416.
117 Id. ("When the objective is to identify crooks, to catch them in the act, the police
want to keep the existence of undercover agents as hushed up as possible.... Deter-
rent stings have the opposite property. If the objective is to deter criminals, the au-
thorities want to create the impression that there are traps everywhere.").
"' Jacqueline E. Ross, Valuing Inside Knowledge: Police Infiltration as a Problem
for the Law of Evidence, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1111, 1115 (2004) ("[Tlhe ability of
undercover agents to set up easy-to-prove contrived offenses presents a temptation to
overworked law enforcement personnel... ."). See also Natapoff, supra note 17, at
689 (suggesting that police "tolerate, even foster" criminal conduct in informants in
exchange for information).
.89 For an explanation of how social norms may restrain wrongdoing, see Dan M.
Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1513,
1522-23 (2002); see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate
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E. Strategy 5: Amnesty
The final strategy that policymakers might utilize is to offer uni-
dentified perpetrators lesser penalties in exchange for cessation of
criminal activity, self-reporting, and sometimes assistance in identi-
fying and prosecuting co-conspirators." Amnesty programs have
been implemented in both tax and antitrust contexts.191
Like the undercover strategy, the amnesty strategy is aimed pri-
marily at current offenders."i Unlike all of the foregoing strategies,
the amnesty strategy should be most successful in marginally deter-
ring MFPs when either the likelihood of detection or sanctions ap-
pear to be on the verge of a significant increase. Recall the exam-
ple of the CEO who fraudulently obtains 1MM. Originally, he
determined that the benefits of his crime exceeded the costs of his
conduct:
(1MM) > (10%)(2MM).
Governance, in Symposium: The Dysfunctional Boards: Causes and Cures, U. Cin. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133117, (citing Regan,
supra note 56, at 975 (2007)).
" For economic discussions of self-reporting, see, e.g., Robert Innes, Self-Reporting
in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of
Apprehension, 29 J. Legal Stud. 287 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal
Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 583 (1994).
191 For discussions of tax amnesty programs, compare Craig M. Boise, Breaking
Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty, 14 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 667, 670 (2007) (devising an "optimal tax amnesty theory"), with Leo P.
Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 Va. Tax
Rev. 535 (1991) (criticizing tax amnesties as generally ineffective). For a general
discussion of the Department of Justice's "Corporate Leniency Policy" and its ef-
fect on enforcement of antitrust violations, see Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust,
Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement of
the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 715, 716 (2001)
(arguing that the Corporate Leniency Policy may produce overdeterrence). See
also Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Crim. Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Just., Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program (Nov. 22-23, 2004),
httg://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.pdf.
The amnesty strategy therefore differs from the government's courting of whis-
tleblower employees, who are themselves innocent of wrongdoing. See Natapoff, su-
pra note 17, at 651-52. It also differs from the government's treatment of defendants
who are offering information and cooperation after the government has already initi-
ated prosecution. Compared to the MFP, the defendant who has already been identi-
fied and prosecuted is far less likely to be in a position to continue his fraudulent ac-
tivities.
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When sanctions increased by a factor of 5 after the CEO had al-
ready commenced the crime, I predicted that the CEO would
choose to continue his conduct if his perceived linkage exceeded
50%. This was because the CEO would compare the foregone
sanction (2MM), multiplied by the linkage factor, with the revised
sanction, multiplied by the original probability of punishment. In-
deed, if linkage were as high as 100%, sanctions would have to in-
crease by a factor of 10 to convince the CEO to terminate his
criminal conduct.
Suppose now that the CEO has the option of confessing his sins
and thereby avoiding the increased sanctions. Assuming that there
were no additional benefits to be gained from continued lying, the
CEO will confess when the expected penalty of continued lying
(probability p of detection multiplied by the sanction, S) exceeds
the costs of amnesty (A):
(p)(S) > A.
One of the problems with amnesty programs is that legislators
are likely to tinker with their terms in order to make them more
palatable to the public. For example, to gain society's acceptance,
an amnesty scheme may require the criminal to forfeit at least the
value of the benefit that he has wrongfully obtained.93 Forfeiture,
however, may cause the MFP to keep to his original plan: if p and S
remain steady at 10% and 2MM, the CEO has no incentive to con-
fess under an amnesty program that includes disgorgement, since
1MM is far greater than 10% of 2MM.'94 If, however, lawmakers
also increase the expected value of sanctions to more than 1MM by
increasing penalties or improving enforcement, the CEO will
choose amnesty. In other words, if the expected penalty is in-
creased by slightly more than a factor of 5, the CEO will discon-
tinue the fraud in return for amnesty. In contrast, as set forth
above in Subsections A and B, when linkage is present without an
113 Cf. Roger Bowles, Michael Faure & Nuno Garoupa, Forfeiture of Illegal Gain:
An Economic Perspective, 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 275, 276 (2005) (observing that
forfeiture statutes have become popular in the contexts of environmental and white
collar crime).
" Id. at 285 (highlighting that "removal of illegal gain" alone will not provide opti-
mal deterrence).
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offer of amnesty, enforcement and sanctions must increase far
more to marginally deter MiFPs.
In sum, when used alongside traditional enforcement strategies,
amnesty reduces the effort necessary to identify and stop MFPs 9 5
Indeed, amnesty is the flip side of detection avoidance: when the
expected value of a given penalty increases, the value of amnesty
increases alongside the value of detection avoidance. 1 But even
after the government establishes an amnesty program, whether an
MiFP chooses it over detection avoidance will depend in large part
on the terms of the program.
Although some MFPs may continue their crimes because the
psychic thrill of violating the law is itself so overwhelmingly pleas-
ant that it exceeds the value of any forgiven sanction, most MFPs
are unlikely to fall within this category. The more likely reason
MFPs may continue committing crimes despite the government's
promise of amnesty is that the "amnesty" itself may be difficult to
verify. If it extends to only some legal sanctions (e.g., to criminal
but not civil penalties), fails to take account of informal sanctions
such as loss of one's job or status, or is defined or applied in an un-
certain manner, it is unlikely to persuade the MFP to terminate the
fraud.
Finally, even as amnesty strategies assist in the apprehension of
MFPs, they may also undermine the deterrence of potential of-
fenders. Those contemplating corporate frauds may question the
credibility of threatened sanctions because they perceive the possi-
ble escape hatch of future amnesty programs.
19 Cf. Boise, supra note 191, at 700 (observing that amnesty may "ease the transition
to a new legal regime or signal an impending change in enforcement activities").
196 Conversely, amnesty reduces the value of detection avoidance. There is less rea-
son to go to the trouble of hiding information when there are few costs associated
with its disclosure. For an example of a proposal keyed to the idea of encouraging the
dissemination of information by reducing the costs of its disclosure, see Paul Schwartz
& Edward Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 913, 936-
37 (2007) (describing regime for data security leaks in which consumers would receive
information about the leak but not the identity of the entity responsible for the leak).
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There is no perfect solution to this problem.' 97 The best use of
amnesty programs may be in limited situations where the govern-
ment can eliminate future offenders through structural changes.
For example, if an industry's members have used fraudulent prac-
tices to procure funds through a government-sponsored program, a
law enforcement agency might pair amnesty strategies aimed at
MFPs with the elimination of the afflicted program.
F. Conclusion
This Part has reviewed five strategies that the government might
rely upon in response to pervasive fraud: (A) increased sanctions;
(B) increased enforcement; (C) both increased sanctions and in-
creased enforcement; (D) undercover investigations; and (E) am-
nesty. The degree of linkage in a given context will have an impor-
tant bearing on the effectiveness of each of these strategies for
deterring MFPs. Lawmakers who consider these strategies must
weigh the effects of their chosen policies on both MFPs and poten-
tial offenders. Although this approach complicates the lawmakers'
task, it vastly improves their final product of criminal enforcement
legislation. In contrast, mindlessly ratcheting up prison sentences
and fines may prolong and worsen frauds already in progress by
causing MFPs to cover up their crimes and do more harm.
IV. THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF LINKAGE
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, traditional law en-
forcement strategies may fail to deter current perpetrators when
linkage factors are present. Alternative strategies such as under-
cover investigations and amnesty programs may identify or deter
MFPs, but they have their own drawbacks. As noted above, the
strategies that best address the proliferation of MFPs may also un-
dermine the deterrence of potential perpetrators. Nevertheless, for
crimes that are likely to include a large MFP population, the delib-
197 Schwartz and Janger suggest that the appropriate legal rule will turn on whether
the community seeks to impose sanctions or mitigate the underlying problem. Where
mitigation is the primary goal, "very little may be lost by [identifying the particular
source of a security breach], and much may be gained in terms of a firm's willingness
to disclose." Schwartz & Janger, supra note 196, at 937.
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erate and limited use of these alternate enforcement strategies may
be necessary.
This final Part provides an overview of some of the practical re-
sponses that lawmakers might adopt in light of the temporal issues
associated with fraud. The following are only a few of the areas in
which linkage might better inform our response to undesirable
conduct in corporate settings.
A. Identifying Linkage
Although this Article focuses on linkage in the corporate fraud
context, the concept has applications for other violations of law.
Policymakers would find it fruitful to identify those violations for
which linkage is most likely to attach. Immigration violations are
another category of conduct in which linkage problems might ex-
plain the problems with traditional law enforcement policies. Ille-
gal immigrants who have used false identification documents to ob-
tain employment are not likely to stop lying about their status
when Congress ratchets up penalties for using false identification.
Telling the truth would result not only in the loss of employment
but also an increase in the likelihood of being penalized and de-
ported.
It is also useful to note that other factors besides linkage cause
criminals to persist in their conduct, regardless of the perceived le-
gal costs of continuing or terminating such conduct. For example,
drug dealing is not necessarily a highly linked crime. The cessation
of sales on one day does not, by its very nature, increase one's like-
lihood of detection the next day. Exogenous factors, however, may
cause a drug dealer to persist in his business despite dramatic in-
creases in penalties. For example, his purchasers may have threat-
ened to kill him if he fails to deliver the drugs. Or he might know
no other way to support himself or to feed his drug addiction.
These cases differ from linkage in that the sources of continued
conduct (the drug dealer's fear of violence, his lack of employment
opportunities, or his physical addiction) stand apart from his prob-
ability of detection.
By contrast, fraud is inherently linked. That is, the nature of the
crime itself, as opposed to some outside social or personal factor,
requires the criminal to continue future conduct in order to avoid
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liability for past conduct. For "inherent" cases of linkage, lawmak-
ers should attempt to pinpoint the moment at which linkage arises.
It may be that linkage exists from the moment the crime is com-
menced. On the other hand, for some crimes, linkage may arise at a
particular moment in the life of the crime.
Corporate fraud, for example, may be terminable early on in the
scheme, but nearly unstoppable after several reporting cycles. One
response to the timing issues discussed in Part III might be to re-
duce the number of MEFPs by redefining fraud into one or more
graded crimes, and thus changing the point at which fraud becomes
"complete." Currently, the federal fraud statutes apply as soon as
the defendant devises a "scheme" to defraud and uses a proscribed
medium, such as wires, mail, or securities filings. Instead of relying
on a single definition of fraud that ignores the temporal aspect of
the crime, Congress might create several graded offenses that
hinge on how far the scheme has proceeded. The most serious
crimes would be those in which the defendant had engaged in re-
peated interaction with his victims and had caused them harm. Si-
multaneously, Congress might enact a lesser penalty for frauds that
had been devised but not yet caused the victim any loss. The
graded approach to fraud would, in effect, reinvigorate the concept
of attempt as a lesser, yet still serious, offense.
Although a graded approach might eliminate some of the MFPs
who had barely commenced their schemes, its benefits would be
admittedly modest as applied to those MIFPs who had already trig-
gered linkage factors by lying and causing harm to their victims.
Grading, after all, is simply another way of imposing harsher sanc-
tions for increasingly harmful conduct."9 An MFP will choose the
risk of the harsher sanction when he believes that cessation of his
conduct will inevitably result in sanctions for his prior conduct.
198 Grading can also serve the function of distinguishing between different levels of
moral culpability. For a discussion of how the Model Penal Code and New York Pe-
nal Code have used grading to sort, respectively, levels of culpability and extent of
harm, see Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The
Challenge of the Special Part, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 297 (1998); see also Michael Ca-
hill, Offense Grading and Multiple Liability: New Challenges for a Model Penal Code
Second, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 599, 601 (2004) (arguing that grading schemes are used
to distinguish the "seriousness" of given offenses).
1357
1358 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 94:1295
There may be moments in the early life of a fraud, however, where
linkage is fairly low. In these situations, the threat of more serious
sanctions should be more effective. Grading therefore should track
the linkage curve of a given crime. Tracking such a curve would re-
quire lawmakers to identify a "typical scheme" and then to deter-
mine when, in the course of that scheme, cessation of conduct be-
comes impossible without simultaneously increasing the likelihood
of detection."9 Where a certain type of crime is pervasive and bears
similar characteristics, lawmakers should consider expending such
effort, because it may result in a more efficient legal regime and
therefore more marginal deterrence. When society experiences an
uptick in crimes, but those crimes share few similarities, tracking
the linkage curve of an individual crime may be too costly because
it pertains to only one type of scheme. Under these circumstances,
lawmakers might prefer a different approach, which I discuss be-
low.
B. Altering the Perpetrator's Mindset
A second prescription that might flow from Part III's analysis is
that the law should better instruct defendants ex ante on the tem-
poral aspects of highly linked crimes, such as fraud. This concept
arises in two strains of literature: "transition smoothing" and "de-
biasing."
1. Transition Smoothing
One might view the linkage problem as a variant of "transition
smoothing. ', 21 Increased penalties and detection create transition
problems for MFPs who either failed to anticipate these increases
or were unable to protect themselves in advance. The question is
... For an example of how one might "grade" a particular crime, see Kramer, supra
note 54, at 410-11 (describing phases of planning and execution of burglary and argu-
ing that attempt sanctions ought to track the criminal's cost-benefit calculation).
00 Louis Kaplow has discussed at length legal transitions and the government's re-
sponse to issues raised by changes in legal policy. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1986). Although much of his
analysis is applicable to criminal law, his analysis is restricted technically to civil law.
See id. at 512 & n.1.
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the extent to which lawmakers should recognize and attempt to
"smooth" these transitions.
Some might argue that transitions should not be a problem at all
for corporate criminals because they are already in the business of
weighing future costs and benefits. Just as businessmen are gener-
ally expected to expect and bear the costs of many changes in legal
policy, rational and sophisticated criminals should assume that
criminal law enforcement policy is not fixed. Therefore, if criminals
have taken future transitions into account, they presumably have
"priced" those shocks into their scheme or otherwise have found
some mechanism to soften them. Perverse outcomes such as detec-
tion avoidance and increased criminality therefore theoretically
should not arise in response to conspicuous increases in sanctions
or probabilities of detection because criminals have already figured
the future change into the criminal equation.
Yet in reality, we know that corporate executives do not plan
adequately for many types of transitions in law, including those re-
lating to criminal law enforcement. Although this failure may stem
in part from cognitive biases, it also arises because even sophisti-
cated criminals lack the ability to predict the future."' Moreover,
unlike individuals who operate within the constraints of the law,
perpetrators of crime lack full access to the two mechanisms on
which individuals traditionally rely to spread and reduce risks: in-
surance and financial markets.2° In other words, no matter how
well they plan in advance, some corporate executives who have ini-
tiated and planned corporate frauds will find themselves caught
unawares when the government announces policy changes in
criminal sanctions and enforcement.
Under this view, amnesty programs might be defended as a form
of smoothing. 3 They ease the pains of changes in law enforcement
policy and reduce the need for criminals to pass those pains on to
211 "[T]he recognition that the legal system is dynamic does not give one clairvoy-
ance concerning the precise changes that will occur." Id. at 525.
02 Id. at 527-28 (noting that insurance and diversification through financial markets
are primary mechanisms for spreading transition risks). Although perpetrators may
be able to use market diversification indirectly to smooth transition risks associated
with criminal frauds, their access to these markets is clearly more limited and there-
fore less efficient in spreading risk.203See Boise, supra note 191, at 700-01.
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victims in the form of increased fraud or increased investment in
detection avoidance. That being said, lawmakers must take peri-
odic stock of amnesty programs to ensure that their benefits, such
as marginally deterring current criminals and interfering with the
creation and maintenance of criminal networks, outweigh the costs,
such as creating moral hazards and undermining the expressive
value of law.
2. Debiasing
Another manner of responding to current perpetrators might be
the adoption of a "debiasing" strategy. Whereas transition-based
strategies address criminal mistakes ex post, debiasing strategies
attempt to eliminate similar mistakes ex ante. For example, one
might argue that linkage arises because corporate fraud perpetra-
tors fail to formulate adequate exit strategies when they commence
frauds. As a result, increases in sanctions and detection cannot
marginally deter these criminals because they truly have "no exit."
Various cognitive biases may be to blame for the criminals' lack of
exit strategies. Hyperbolic discounting and excess optimism may
cause perpetrators to ignore the necessity for mechanisms that de-
link future incidences of criminality from prior incidences of fraud.
As a result, perpetrators cannot be marginally deterred, even when
sanctions or probability of detection increase.
If bounded rationality removes perpetrators' incentives to create
adequate exit strategies from their frauds, then lawmakers might
respond with policies aimed at "debiasing" those perpetrators; that
is, to counteract the various biases and heuristics that cause perpe-
trators to discount the penalties they will likely receive, and to
educate them as to the future exit problems that are likely to arise
if they go ahead with their frauds.2' As Professors Christine Jolls
2 A different technique would be to debias the shareholders who are the victims of
corporate fraud. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, Counter Cyclical Enforcement of Corpo-
rate Law, I11. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Papers Series (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968757 (arguing for countercyclical law enforcement strate-
gies in order to correct shareholders' incorrect perceptions of low incidences of fraud
in good economies and high incidences of fraud in bad ones). The problem with this
strategy is that shareholders are ordinarily unable to monitor adequately the corpo-
rate executives who run firms.
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and Cass Sunstein have observed, debiasing is a fairly under-
explored area of law. 25 Although behavioral economics now enjoys
a wide audience, the more common response triggered by it are
policies that insulate outcomes from biases and heuristics. 2' Debi-
asing is different because it "involves the government in a self-
conscious process of changing the behavior of at least some people
by altering their perceptions of the world around them."'
As Jolls and Sunstein concede, debiasing poses thorny implica-
tions insofar as it encourages the government to manipulate public
perception. Concerns run the gamut from overshooting to serious
abuses of power. °8 For criminals, debiasing raises additional wor-
ries. At its best, debiasing facilitates a person's "opportunity to
make choices."" ° In other words, instead of foreclosing certain
conduct (by fines or regulations), the government generates better
outcomes by facilitating better (i.e., more rational) decisionmak-
ing.2
10
Where criminals are concerned, however, better decisionmaking
is not always a positive outcome. It is one thing to enable consum-
ers to make better product choices or jurors to render more accu-
rate verdicts by eliminating various biases; it is quite another to
improve criminal decisionmaking by encouraging perpetrators to
contend with excessive discounting or over-optimism. While some
white collar criminals might abandon corporate crime when con-
fronted with their cognitive biases, others might respond by craft-
ing better pricing and exit strategies. Still others might migrate to
crimes that pose a lesser threat of detection."' In other words, de-
205 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 201.
206 Id. at 226.
207 Id. at 202-03.
208 See id. at 230-31. See also Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalist
Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 411, 413 (2007).
2 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 226.
210 For example, Jolls and Sunstein suggest that policymakers might use the avail-
ability heuristic (the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of an event based on the
availability of information about that event) to counteract smokers' overoptimism
about the risks that cigarettes pose to their future health. "Concrete information ap-
pears to render the incident in question available in a way that can successfully coun-
teract optimism bias." Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 210.
211 See also Katyal, supra note 46, at 2402-03 (discussing substitution effects from
crack cocaine to heroin as a result of dramatic increase in penalties for dealing crack).
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biasing might make some criminals better off, not worse. The over-
all number of criminals might decrease, but the ones who remained
might cause more damage to society. By making criminals better
decisionmakers, debiasing might reduce social welfare.
In this sense, the debiasing dilemma is similar to transition
smoothing. Criminals fail to cease corporate fraud in response to
law enforcement policy changes because they have failed to secure
adequate exit strategies and plan in advance for transitions in legal
policy. Society is therefore faced with the following choice: encour-
age criminals to plan ahead, or insulate society from perverse out-
comes that emanate from law enforcement transitions. Which is
the better path?
To date, no lawmaker has suggested a law enforcement strategy
based solely or even primarily on debiasing criminals. It is doubtful
that any politically prudent lawmaker will do so in the near future.
Nevertheless, lawmakers ought to consider, when choosing among
policies, whether those policies have the tendency to exacerbate or
mitigate linkage problems. Assuming that longer frauds are more
highly linked ones, policies that remind potential criminals in ad-
vance of the timing aspects of their frauds are likely to be more
beneficial than policies that take no account of timing whatsoever.
If corporate executives perpetuate frauds because they, na'vely or
corruptly, expect better returns in the future, lawmakers must con-
sider how and whether current laws perpetuate those expectations.
Unfortunately, nothing in the current criminal or civil law ap-
pears to forewarn potential fraudsters of the linkage factor that will
likely appear and increase over the course of a fraud. The Supreme
Court's latest decision on fraud on the market, Dura Pharmaceuti-
cals v. Broudo,"2 unwittingly perpetuates the corporate executive's
na've hope that better information will surface in the future and
thereby counteract the fraud. Dura rejected the shareholder plain-
tiff's contention, in a civil securities fraud case, that the company's
misrepresentations harmed him as of the moment he purchased the
stock at an inflated price."3 Instead, the plaintiff was obligated to
show both economic loss and "proximate cause" from the com-
212 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
..3 Id. at 342.
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pany's misrepresentations, a showing the plaintiff could accomplish
by demonstrating a market decline after the announcement of the
fraud.1  Since bad news (the fraud) can be combined with good
news (a new contract or patent, for example), Dura potentially un-
dermines attempts to value the losses caused by corporate fraud. It
also permits and even encourages executives to continue to dis-
count the possibility that their lies will eventually unravel. Under
Dura, the executive can at least hope that there will appear future
good news on the horizon, which he can then bundle with the (as
yet undisclosed) bad news and thereby soften his fall from grace."5
Although Dura is a civil fraud-on-the-market case, courts have
begun to apply its rationale in criminal cases.1 6 Moreover, one
would expect rational and informed corporate executives to con-
sider both criminal and civil penalties in advance of and during
their conduct. The federal Sentencing Guidelines, although advi-
sory,217 measure damages according to: the defendant's "intended
loss," the victim's "actual loss," or, where loss calculations are too
difficult to quantify, according to the defendant's actual gain."8 The
loss calculations do not, for the most part, take the duration of the
fraud into account, except in rare and extreme cases in which the
fraud lasts such a short time that the defendant can claim that the
entire episode was an "aberrant" act.29 Accordingly, like the
214 See id. at 347 (criticizing the complaint's failure to allege "that Dura's share price
fell significantly after the truth became known").
215 See James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After
Dura Pharmaceuticals, 95 Geo. L.J. 653, 657 (2007).16 See, e.g., United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2007) (praising
Dura's "useful guidance" for sentencing in securities fraud cases); United States v.
Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005) (advising that "[t]he civil damage measure
should be the backdrop for criminal responsibility" in sentencing). But see United
States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 2005) (electing to set defendant's sen-
tence for securities fraud by reference to his gain rather than to victims' losses, be-
cause losses were too difficult to quantify and civil cases were inapposite).
217 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).211 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 comment. n.3 (2007); Mooney, 425
F.3d at 1100 (advocating measurement of sentence by defendant's gain).219 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.20 (2007) (defining an aberrant act as a
"single criminal occurrence or single criminal transaction" that required little plan-
ning, "was of limited duration," and "represents a marked deviation by the defendant
from an otherwise law-abiding life"). Theoretically, courts are no longer bound by the
departure's narrow definition. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595
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method outlined in Dura, the current method of measuring crimi-
nal corporate fraud provides no incentive for perpetrators to
shorten the duration of their frauds.
In contrast, one could imagine a legal regime that would penal-
ize longer term frauds over shorter ones. Judges, who are now free
to sentence offenders without strict adherence to the Sentencing
Guidelines," ° could sentence offenders in such a way as to account
for the length of the fraud. In the securities context, accounting
frauds that lasted more than several reporting periods should gar-
ner more prison time, as well as greater fines and economic penal-
ties, than frauds of shorter duration.221
CONCLUSION
Although the concept of law as a deterrent has been more or less
accepted in the realm of administrative regulation and tort law, it
has a much more complicated relationship with criminal law.
Lawmakers routinely invoke "deterrence" as a reason for expand-
ing criminal law, increasing penalties, or promising greater en-
forcement of white collar crimes. Scholars, however, have either
downplayed or completely dismissed the value of deterrence the-
ory for predicting, much less controlling, criminal conduct.222 In-
stead, they argue, cultural norms and the individual's relationship
with society are far more likely to determine whether criminal
(2007) (finding that lower court's departure from Guidelines sentence for defendant
did not require extraordinary circumstances). To the extent that the Guidelines re-
main a primary source and starting point for judges, however, it is unlikely that the
duration of crimes such as fraud will figure highly in their calculations.
220 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
221 This is not to say that corporate executives at public companies do not worry
about the next quarter's results. To the contrary, executives are "fixat[ed]" on the
earnings reports they must make to shareholders on a quarterly basis. Henry T.C. Hu,
Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 277,
303 (1990). The mismatch between the fixation on the timing of earnings and the con-
trasting lack of regard for the duration of fraud, however, encourages executives to
discount further the penalties likely to accrue from their criminal conduct.
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formu-
lation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst when Doing Its Best, 91 Geo. L.J. 949,
953-56 (2003).
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conduct takes place.223 These norms-based arguments have prolif-
erated from criminal law generally to the study of corporate law, as
scholars now argue that executives refrain from wrongdoing not
because they are rationally afraid of penalties if they are caught,
but for a host of psychological reasons that bear little resemblance
to Gary Becker's 1968 model.
The theory of linkage articulated in this Article does not attempt
to resolve the tensions between these two schools of thought. It
does illustrate, however, that classic deterrence models may be use-
ful in illuminating issues that otherwise would be largely ignored. 4
It is the deterrence-based analysis of fraud that allows us to see
that "linkage"-the connection between cessation of future wrong-
ful conduct and punishment for prior wrongful conduct-is a par-
ticularized problem lurking below the surface of many crimes. Al-
though the benefits of deterring "new" or potential offenders may
far outweigh the benefits of marginally deterring (or incapacitat-
ing) current ones, lawmakers should at least be aware of these
tradeoffs at the outset so that they can consider alternate strategies
instead of reflexively increasing sanctions and enforcement. Unlike
norms-based analyses, deterrence theory forces lawmakers to con-
front these tradeoffs head-on and to better understand why fraud
might persist. Even if we pay attention to these issues, we will
never eliminate fraud. We might, however, adopt smarter-and
cheaper-policies.
21 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
224 See also Katyal, supra note 94, at 1311 ("[T]he dominant motif in criminal law
scholarship has veered too far toward retributivist analysis."). Cf. Steven Shavell, An
Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1877, 1903
(1993). ("[E]conomic analysis has its two usual virtues. First, it helps to describe be-
havior, which sometimes has complex and interesting aspects .... Second, it aids in
making recommendations.").
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